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FINANCIAL INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE: CHALLENGES FOR REGULATION 
AND SUPERVISION
Banks have always managed to make the most of technology to improve their efficiency and 
the service provided to their customers, but they now face a new wave of innovation with much 
wider implications for financial services. Despite the acknowledged benefits, developments in 
technology and their implications on the efficiency, financial stability, consumer protection and 
integrity of the financial system require a holistic response by regulators and supervisors. 
This paper aims at analyzing the potential benefits of the digitisation of finance, the new risks 
that digital infrastructures, business and distribution models and customer solutions may 
pose, and the expected regulatory and supervisory response. The new digital paradigm 
presents new risks in terms of cyber security, consumer protection, operational continuity and 
fraud, among others. These are not fully covered by the traditional supervisory and regulatory 
approach. Hence there is a need for a renewed regulatory and supervisory framework that 
fully captures the potential of digital innovation and makes the financial system more resilient 
against future crises. The response should rest, at least, on four pillars: well-defined policies 
on the control and management of new technological risks in the financial sector, the launch 
of innovation hubs, the creation of supervised safe environments for market experimentation 
(regulatory sandboxes) and the acquisition of new digital skills and a collaborative mindset.
The evolution of economy and society is featured by continuous change. Most of the time, 
this change is slow and incremental but, every now and then, rapid disruptive changes 
take place in short periods of time, leading to what are commonly known as “revolutions”. 
We are living now one of these stages of disruption. Massive adoption of digital technologies 
invented in the second half of the 20th century, namely the Internet and mobile phones, 
together with the exponential growth in computation and storage capacity at a lower cost, 
is radically transforming the world, profoundly changing personal relationships, business 
organisations and, in general, the way economic value is created.
Triggered by technological advances and by other socioeconomic dynamics, a series of 
trends have emerged related to consumer behavior and business models. The combined 
effect of these three groups of transformational forces – i.e., those pertaining to consumer 
behavior, technology and business – have given rise to the so-called “fourth industrial 
revolution” which is already reshaping the economy and society, and will further continue 
to do so in the future, producing disruptive changes at an unprecedented speed, following 
an exponential rather than a linear pace. 
First, most consumers are immersed in an information and services continuum to which 
they can be constantly connected through their personal ecosystem of devices. In this new 
environment, customers have more power than ever. They feel they need to be connected, 
anywhere, anytime. They also want their needs to be met immediately, including the 
consumption of relevant and useful content. Customers are also becoming increasingly 
aware of the benefits that smart data can bring.
The changes in consumer behavioural patterns take on special importance in the context 
of the two new generations: millennials and centennials.1 It is crucial to understand the
 
1  Millennials or Generation Y are young people born in the 1980s and 1990s and Centennials or Generation Z are 
people born from 2000 onwards.
Abstract
1  The digital 
transformation 
of the economy 
and the society
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services that are being and will continue to be demanded by these younger generations 
and by older “non-native” generations which are rapidly becoming digitalised. Apart from 
this, their loyalty to banks is much less evident than that of previous generations. More 
than 70% of them would use a financial service offered by a company from outside the 
sector, compared with 50% of older customers. 
Second, the growth in mobile technology and the development of smartphones has changed 
the digital landscape to the point that most of our online connections are made in mobility.
Digitisation of interactions, sensorisation and connectivity are driving exponential growth in 
the volume of generated data. Now the challenge is how to turn this data into actionable 
knowledge. Big data technologies along with the advances in Artificial Intelligence and Machine 
Learning will help to improve interaction in areas such as virtual assistants or automation 
through algorithms, and to extract this knowledge through the identification of behavioural 
patterns of consumers, predict future market trends or prevent transactional fraud.
The success in the use of the above-mentioned technologies can nevertheless be weighed 
down by heavy and rigid legacy infrastructures with a high cost of ownership. Companies 
are trying to overcome this hindrance by evolving towards “smart” infrastructures, like 
cloud computing, which are flexible, agile and efficient, easily manageable in cost and 
effort.
Third, in this world where technology serves as a basic facilitator, and consumers run away 
from complexity, forward-looking companies have realised that they have to change their 
business model. A satisfactory customer experience means getting their problems solved 
in real time through the channel of their choice. The implications of this integrated experience 
for companies are complex, because it requires the ability to provide tailored solutions, 
knowing the context in which the customer is, and to orchestrate the necessary channels 
to deliver them in a transparent way. It also requires profound changes in the talent and 
culture within the organisation, which must evolve towards structures which are more 
agile and flexible and less hierarchical within more collaborative environments in which 
information can flow without unnecessary restrictions.
Moreover, exponential technologies have facilitated the surge of new digital native competitors 
in practically every industry. These competitors are coming from outside established sectors. 
They have detected trends in customer behaviour and technologies that offer chances of 
success in competition with incumbents. There are two main types of new digital competitor: 
big internet players (such as Google, Apple, Amazon or Facebook) and start-ups with a 
flexible business model and without legacy structures.
All in all, these three forces have been affecting almost every industry in the world for the 
last 10 years, with a pervasiveness and depth which are transforming every value chain.
This digital revolution has also arrived in the financial sector. Currently there is no doubt 
that the financial sector is at a major crossroads. The negative impact of the economic 
environment on banking, expectations of a prolonged period of low interest rates and the 
stagnation in lending lead inevitably to the quest for transformation processes that enable 
costs to be reduced and a boost in revenues. 2Things become more complicated if we take 
2  J. M. González-Páramo (2016), admission speech at the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences 
“Reinventing banking: from the great recession to the digital disruption”, http://www.racmyp.es/R/racmyp/docs/
discursos/D90.pdf. 
2  Digitisation: Reshaping 
the financial industry2 
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into account two additional factors: the reputational problems still weighing on banks and 
the assimilation of the aftermath of the regulatory tsunami. Accepting that all the above 
requires profound changes in the sector; the presence of this radical disruptive force, the 
digital revolution, has changed everything. 
Paradoxical as it may sound, technology could become the major gearshift in the financial 
sector for decades. In fact, banking has always managed to take advantage of technology 
to improve its efficiency and the service provided to its customers, but it now faces new 
developments with much wider implications.
Digital disruption may help banks to survive the pressures of low growth, waning profitability 
and tough regulation, and to solidly re-establish customers’ trust and reputation with society. 
If banks can offer a better user experience, they will again come closer to what customers 
demand and need to satisfy their aspirations and take advantage of the opportunity of this 
new age, since they are already being exposed to the digital transformation in nearly every 
aspect of their daily lives. 
The disruption characterising the transition in banking is reflected in irreversible changes in 
both the demand for and supply of financial services. On the demand side, we are already 
seeing radical changes in the patterns of consumption and savings behaviour of a whole 
generation. The two new generations of digital natives, the millennials and the centennials, 
have started joining the labour force, and in the coming years they will become increasingly 
important customers not just of banking but of a whole range of sectors. In a context of 
increasing competition such as the current one, it is crucial to understand the services that 
are being and will continue to be demanded by these younger generations and by older 
“non-native” generations which are rapidly digitising.
As for the disruptions seen in supply, the sector is facing greater competition and technological 
changes that will decisively affect the quantity, quality and price of financial services. 
Regarding competition, over the past few years we have seen an increase in the number of 
new players coming from the digital world, the “fintechs”. Their objective is to concentrate on 
specific segments of the value chain (foreign exchange, payments, loans, trade, asset 
management or insurance, for example), unbundling or disaggregating the services previously 
originated and sold by the banking sector. These companies start without the burden of 
having to maintain a physical distribution network, the rigidities of corporate culture, the 
upkeep of obsolescent technological systems or tough banking regulations. Also, the sector 
will have to compete not only with providers emerging in the financial sector, but also with 
those arriving from other areas, in particular, the major digital companies, Google, Apple, 
Facebook and Amazon (which we refer to under the acronym GAFA).
And new competition will be joined by technological changes either underway or yet to 
come. As we have seen, there are a number of exponential technologies interacting with 
other digital innovations, such as the large-scale use of big data, artificial intelligence, 
blockchain and cloud computing. All this will open the way to different modes of participating 
in the digital ecosystem, such as by acquiring or taking equity stakes in “fintechs”, by 
developing internal capabilities or through open innovation.
Thus, the real question is not whether banking will change radically, which it undoubtedly 
will, but rather whether banks will still play a significant role in the new financial ecosystem. 
Banking would have to adapt its strategies radically to survive this unbridled competition 
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from new entrants. Success will be determined by the ability to, first, take care of their 
main asset: the customer experience, secondly re-establish their reputations; and finally, 
reach keener prices and automation of processes so that customers can devote only the 
time they consider absolutely necessary to administering their finances.
This model requires profound changes of talent and culture within the organisation, which 
needs to evolve towards structures which are more agile and flexible, and less hierarchical, 
within more collaborative environments in which information can flow without unnecessary 
restrictions. The cultural change must favour the process of continuous innovation, which 
values learning through success, and in which failure is quickly identified and controlled, 
allowing progress to be made towards the realisation of the bank’s strategic vision. Thus it 
involves a transformation in three areas: technological, strategic and in terms of corporate 
culture and talent. It is, in short, a complete reinvention of the banking business.
In this context of disruptive change, two forces will be fundamental for determining the speed 
of change and the scenario towards which the sector will move. The first, which is internal 
in nature, concerns the banks’ vision of the future and their technological, financial and 
organisational capacity for self-transformation. The second is the role of the regulators 
and supervisors as drivers of or brakes on the changes needed during the transition.
 As mentioned above, regulators and supervisors act as key drivers of, or brakes on, the 
changes needed during the transformation of the financial industry. As a starting premise, 
regulation in the financial sector is necessary, as is more intensive supervision than in other 
sectors. This general principle is based on the intrinsic characteristics of the banking 
business, primarily understood as the means of channelling the savings generated in the 
economy towards the different participants: individuals, businesses and governments. 
This process of intermediation is organised broadly through the transformation of maturities 
and the provision of various financial services that facilitate daily transactional operations 
by customers, mainly linked to the space of payments.
The recurring crises that have been experienced in the world economy over the past 
decades have shown that the existence of strong financial systems is crucial for stability 
and economic growth. The prerequisite for achieving economic stability is to ensure that 
financial institutions work properly. The aim is to safeguard the stability of the financial 
system by ensuring that the vital roles played by the banking sector in the economy do not 
suffer significant disruption or that the institutions do not collapse.
To this end, regulation and supervision in the sector seeks four objectives: i) promoting the 
stability of the financial system, avoiding systemic risk, bank runs and the malfunctioning of 
payment services; ii) maintaining the safety and solvency of banks; iii) protecting consumers 
of financial services, and iv) improving efficiency and competition in the system.3
Traditional regulation has played an essential role in the development of the financial 
sector to date. However, often the promotion of innovation in the financial sector has been 
a secondary objective for the authorities, if not disregarded altogether. This factor, coupled 
with the significant barrier to entry posed by banking regulation itself (which has deterred 
many potential new entrants), explains why the industry has been able to develop its own 
3  See for example European Central Bank, Mission statement of the SSM, ECB (website), <https://www.
bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/mission-statement/mission-statement-of-the-ssm/html/index.en.html> 
or Bank of Spain, Objetivos básicos, Banco de España (website) <http://www.bde.es/bde/es/areas/supervision/
funcion/objetivos_basico/Objetivos_basicos.html>.
3  Regulation and 
supervision: financial 
stability and consumer 
protection 
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pace of innovation in competitive terms to differentiate itself from other banking actors and 
without fearing the entry of new players with radically different approaches.
However, as mentioned before, the digital transformation of the economy and the society 
changes everything, thus forcing authorities to adopt an active position. Regulation and 
supervision are now challenged to provide a regulatory framework that balances the 
promotion of the new digital value propositions – which benefit the customer and introduce 
efficiency gains in the market – and protection against the associated risks.
This section provides a framework to analyse how transformation of the financial sector 
could impact the aforementioned objectives of regulatory and supervisory authorities. 
For the analysis to be systematic, the different transformations of the financial sector are 
categorised into those affecting the infrastructure, the banking products and the distribution 
– or, more generally, the customer relationship –. The first block comprises both financial 
market infrastructures – clearing and settlement of payments and securities – and the 
Information Technology (IT) infrastructure that powers the operations of each financial 
institution. The products block is subdivided into the usual categories of financial products: 
payments, credit, deposits and investment. The final block covers the distribution of products, 
the provision of financial advice and other intermediation services that are involved in the 
distribution value chain of financial services. The main focus of this analysis is on retail 
financial services. However, some changes in wholesale and investment banking are also 
covered, particularly with respect to financial market infrastructure and investment products. 
Figure 1 shows the general analytical framework, including the main changes that are 
taking place in each of the blocks. The following subsections discuss the impact of each 
of the changes. Efficiency gains are presented first, followed by the implications (positive, 
negative or ambivalent) for financial stability, consumer protection and for the integrity of 
the financial system. 
4  The transformation 
of financial services: 
benefits and risks
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
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Aside from this framework, it is important to note that technological advances are also 
directly helping the industry and the authorities to better address the (traditional and new) 
risks to financial stability, consumer protection and the integrity of the financial system. 
The so called “RegTech” solutions improve risk management functions and facilitate more 
effective and efficient compliance with regulatory requirements. They do so by focusing on 
the automation of manual processes and the links between steps in analytical/reporting 
processes, the improvement of data quality, the creation of a holistic view of data, the 
automated analysis of data with applications that are able to learn during the process, and 
the generation of meaningful reports that can be sent to regulators and used internally to 
improve key business decision making.4, 5 The potential usage by supervisors of Regtech 
solution has also been highlighted by De Nederlandsche Bank: “technological innovation 
offers opportunities for supervisors, for example with respect to the automation of certain 
supervisory processes.”6
 Real-time payment systems
Real-time payment systems allow financial institutions to offer instant account-to-account 
payments to retail and business customers on a near-24/7/365 basis. Spain is already 
building its own system, that will be interoperable with the European Instant Payments 
scheme, which is also under construction and should be available by the end of 2017. The 
Bank of Spain and the European Central Bank are taking a leading role in this process, 
supporting bank efforts in this field, addressing clearing and liquidity concerns and 
promoting European interoperability and harmonisation.
Real-time payment systems involve significant initial implementation costs for payment 
service providers (PSPs). However, they may lead to efficiency gains in the future, due to 
reduced investment costs for the maintenance and upgrade of legacy systems, and lower 
variable management costs if real-time payments substitute other payment methods such 
as cash or cheques.7 
From the perspective of financial stability, real-time payment systems introduce new risk 
challenges when compared to traditional retail payment systems. The continuous 
availability of the system (including outside normal business hours) makes operational 
continuity and reliability more demanding, both for the payments system and for the 
participating PSPs. Moreover, given the speed of e-payments, any delay or interruption in 
the service will be directly observable by end-users, which could lead to a quicker triggering 
of reputational risk. In traditional retail payments with deferred clearing, some operational 
incidents may go unnoticed by the customers.8 Furthermore, higher fraud risk may also 
exacerbate operational risks. Indeed, the immediate availability of funds for the payee may 
make real-time payment systems a more attractive target for fraudsters. 
4  Casadas, V., & Sebastián, J. (2016) RegTech, the new magic word in FinTech. Digital Economy Outlook, February 
2016, pp. 4-5. BBVA Research. <https://www.bbvaresearch.com/en/public-compuesta/digital-economy-outlook-
february-2016/capitulo/regtech-the-new-magic-word-in-fintech/>.
5  Van Liebergen, B. et al. (2016) Regtech in Financial Services: Solutions for Compliance and Reporting. Institute of 
International Finance. <https://www.iif.com/system/files/regtech_in_financial_services_-_solutions_for_compliance_
and_reporting.pdf>. 
6  De Nederlandsche Bank (2017). Technological innovation and the Dutch financial sector. 
7  BIS Committee on payments and Market Infrastructures (2016). Fast payments – Enhancing the speed and 
availability of retail payments, BIS <http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d154.htm>. 
8  Fernández, A., & Gorjon, S. (2016). Pagos Inmediatos: ¿Evolución o Revolución?, Revista de Estabilidad 
Financiera, 30. pp. 63-90. Banco de España. <http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/Publicaciones/
InformesBoletinesRevistas/RevistaEstabilidadFinanciera/16/MAYO%202016/restfin2016303.pdf>. 
4.1 INFRASTRUCTURE
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The introduction of credit risk for the participating PSPs depends on whether the settlement 
of payments transactions takes place in real time (gross) or deferred (net). In the latter 
case, the payee’s PSP will face the credit risk of advancing the funds to its customer 
before actually receiving the money from the payer’s PSP. This credit risk can be mitigated 
in different ways: by increasing the frequency and timing of settlement cycles, by signing 
loss-sharing agreements between the participating PSPs, by setting limits on the maximum 
net debit or credit positions, or by requiring PSPs to pre-fund or collateralize their positions. 
However, setting limits might result in some payment transactions being rejected if the 
limits are binding. This might erode the confidence of customers on the system. 
Regarding liquidity risks, systems with real-time settlement involve continuous liquidity 
needs, including outside normal business hours. In systems with deferred settlement, 
liquidity needs are not continuous and are mitigated by the netting of transactions, as in 
traditional retail payment systems. However, liquidity risks are enhanced if new settlement 
cycles are introduced, particularly outside normal business hours. 
Another impact on financial stability is the potential exacerbation of the risk of bank-runs, 
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use real-time payment systems to quickly transfer funds in case of bad news concerning 
a financial institution. 
The continuous operability of real-time payment systems and the immediate availability of 
funds also raise new challenges for consumer protection, particularly against fraud or 
errors. Likewise, preserving the integrity of the financial system requires improving and 
adapting anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) 
procedures to the speed of real-time payment systems. Just like with fraud, the immediate 
availability of funds may attract illegal economic transactions to real-time payment 
systems. 
Distributed ledger technologies
Another transformation of financial market infrastructures arises from the application of 
distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) to the clearing and settlement of payments and 
securities transactions. DLTs facilitate Delivery-versus-Payment (DvP) in these transactions 
without the need of an intermediary, by allowing the simultaneous transfer of cash and 
securities between parties.9 Permissioned DLT networks, with access restricted to pre-
approved institutions, can lead to efficiency gains due to the reduction or elimination of 
intermediary agents and steps. For instance, in cross-border payments, correspondent 
banking could no longer be necessary. In securities clearing and settlement, reconciliation 
costs could be lowered or even eliminated, since DLT networks build an immutable and 
unique record of transactions, instead of the duplicative records of traditional systems.10 
Compliance costs could also be reduced, since supervisory authorities can become a 
special node of the DLT network and directly observe the transactions. Moreover, since 
simultaneity of clearing and settlement in DLT networks reduces credit or counterparty 
risk, there are also efficiency gains due to reduced collateral needs and capital requirements. 
For derivatives, further efficiency gains can be materialised if DLT-based smart contracts 
enable the self-execution of contractual clauses.11
From the perspective of financial stability, the application of DLTs to the settlement of 
payments and securities transactions can reduce settlement risks. However, this increases 
liquidity needs and, therefore, liquidity risks. Furthermore, the application of DLTs can 
improve the operational resilience of financial market infrastructures, since the system of 
multiple validation nodes might make errors or cyber attacks more difficult, as well as 
making the detection and recovery from incidents faster. Nevertheless, the technology will 
first have to prove that it is sufficiently safe and robust. 
Outside the formal financial system, DLTs are behind private cryptocurrencies such as 
Bitcoin. Although the idea of rule-based monies can be attractive in certain contexts, the 
public and ownerless nature of many of these cryptocurrencies involves significant risks 
for consumers: fraud, security, volatility, etc. Moreover, the anonymity (or pseudo-
anonymity) of these DLT networks poses serious risks for anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). For this reason, the European Union will 
9   This is true if we assume the existence of a “cash ledger” within the DL network so that both types of assets 
(cash and securities) are on the same infrastructure. For this reason, so-called “settlement coins” are being 
defined as a way of putting a cash equivalent in the ledger. 
10  Pinna, A., & Ruttenberg, W. (2016). Distributed ledger technologies in securities post-trading. Occasional Paper 
Series, nº 172. European Central Bank. <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop172.en.pdf>. 
11  Brainard, L. (2016). The Use of Distributed Ledger Technologies in Payment, Clearing, and Settlement at The 
Institute of International Finance Blockchain Roundtable, Washington, D.C., April 14, 2016. Federal Reserve 
System. <https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20160414a.pdf>. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 32
include the providers of cryptocurrency exchange and wallet services under the revised 
AML Directive. Moreover, if private DLT networks and cryptocurrencies grow significantly, 
outside the formal financial system, several risks for financial stability may arise. 
Cloud computing in IT infrastructure
Financial institutions are also transforming their IT infrastructure with the migration of 
workloads to cloud computing services. When compared to legacy and centralised 
architectures, cloud solutions offer multiple opportunities associated to flexibility and 
scalability, and allow financial institutions to innovate faster, gain efficiency, reduce time-
to-market and improve productivity exponentially. Cloud computing also allows a shift 
from capital expenditures to operating expenses and offers means for banks to manage 
computing capacity to satisfy customer demands at peak periods.
The use of cloud computing services has several implications for financial stability. For 
instance, outsourcing part of the IT infrastructure means that financial institutions have 
less direct control over operational risks. Nevertheless, cloud computing providers may 
be better prepared to deal with security and other technological risks due to their scale 
and specialisation. In addition, cloud computing may mitigate traditional IT risks, such as 
capacity or resilience. Indeed, it increases the resilience of data due to the “redundancy” 
system in which data is stored. Since backups can be located in remote places, there is 
a greater probability that they can be used in the event of a catastrophe. In any case, 
Service Level Agreements (SLA) between financial institutions and cloud computing 
providers, and the security measures required to the latter, become a key issue for 
operational risk. 
Another impact on financial stability is the possible emergence of new single point of 
failure risk if there is a concentration in the providers of cloud services for the banking 
sector. This is likely to happen considering the economies of scale in the provision of cloud 
computing services, as well as the specific and more stringent requirements for providing 
these services to the financial industry.  
From the perspective of consumer protection, the use of cloud computing services 
increases the flow of personal data. Therefore, there is a need to push for strong security 
measures, such as encryption techniques, and to comply with data location requirements, 
including international personal data transfers outside the EEA, while securing access to 
data by competent authorities.
If an adequate business continuity plan, exit strategies for the case of termination of the 
contractual relationship is not put in place, it can have negative consequences both for 
financial stability and consumer protection.
Retail payments is one of the areas of financial services with the greatest innovation 
activity, both by banks and new players. This subsection covers innovation in payment 
products, some of which run over the innovative infrastructures that were explained in the 
previous section. 
Card-based payments are going mobile, thanks to digital wallets – which store and manage 
cards virtually – and NFC technologies, which enable contactless payments. As well as 
banks, mobile phone manufacturers and operating systems (Apple, Samsung, Android) 
are entering into this business as providers of digital wallets. 
4.2 PRODUCTS
4.2.1 Payments
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New payment solutions are also being developed based on account-to-account credit 
transfers. For instance, real-time retail payment systems are enabling the development of 
new solutions for peer-to-peer and consumer-to-merchant payments. The immediate and 
unconditional availability of funds for the payee offers potential for these solutions to 
partially substitute card-based payments. Moreover, the new EU Payment Services 
Directive will allow third-party payment services providers (TPPs) to initiate credit transfers 
on behalf of customers. This will further increase competition in payments, by allowing 
more players to provide account-based payment services. 
Other innovative solutions are arising from the application of distributed ledger technologies 
(DLTs) to cross-border payments. A number of services are already in the market, based 
on the public blockchain of bitcoin. 
Innovations in retail payments have the potential to reduce costs per transaction, 
particularly in micropayments and cross-border payments, and promote the use of 
e-payments. This may lead to further efficiency gains for the financial system given the 
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
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cost of managing cash. Moreover, the entrance of new players (digital wallet providers, 
TPPs) increases competition in retail payments. 
In terms of financial stability, several risks and vulnerabilities may arise from innovative 
payment solutions. Regarding operational risks, digital and mobile-based solutions increase 
the relevance of technological resilience and cyber risks, and change the nature of fraud risks. 
Furthermore, increased competition increases pressure on the profitability of banks, both 
directly (by reducing margins in the payments business) and indirectly, since new players gain 
access to payments data that is valuable for cross-selling purposes (e.g. credit offerings). 
In addition, the greater interdependency between players, with “weak links” between 
banks, other payment services providers (e.g. TPPs), and new players involved in the value 
chain of payments (e.g. mobile operators or manufacturers), may introduce vulnerabilities 
for the financial system.12 The laxer the regulatory framework for these new players, the 
more severe the vulnerabilities are likely to be. 
New digital payment services also raise new challenges for consumer protection. For 
instance, security and fraud risks depend on the technological solutions employed. 
Moreover, the interrelations between different players require a clear allocation of liabilities 
in case of fraud or errors, to avoid consumer detriment. Finally, to preserve the integrity of 
the financial system, new payment services providers must always be subject to the same 
AML/CFT requirements. 
New credit risk models 
The combination of increased availability of data, greater data processing capabilities and 
new analytical techniques, which is usually referred to as “big data”, allows financial 
services providers to improve their models for creditworthiness assessment. New models 
usually incorporate broader sources of data, such as payment transactions, browsing 
history or even social networks, and make sophisticated analysis of such data through 
complex algorithms. Indeed, algorithms form part of any firm’s know how assets and are 
increasingly becoming a source of competitive advantage.13
Applying big data techniques to credit risk models may improve the accuracy of the 
scoring of potential borrowers, which indeed allows providers to make more accurate 
pricing decisions for loans and other credit products. In addition, the inherent automation 
of these models may reduce the cost of obtaining risk scorings and, hence, the cost of 
processing loan applications or making pre-authorised credit offers. This cost reduction, if 
combined with increased access to external data, may help credit providers to assess the 
risk scoring of non-customers or low-engaged customers for which they have limited 
historical data. In this regard, the new Payment Services Directive (PSD2) and the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will enable customers to transfer their personal data 
between different firms. Furthermore, the use of new sources of data can extend access 
to credit into segments that were previously excluded due to the inability to assess their 
creditworthiness. All these effects may significantly increase the efficiency of credit 
markets, both directly and through increased competition between providers. 
12  Pauget, G. (2016). Systemic risk in payments. Financial Stability Review, 20, pp. 37-44. Banque de France. 
<https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/fi les/medias/documents/financial-stabil ity-
review-20_2016-04.pdf#page=37>.
13  Álvarez Caro, M. (2017). Algorithms challenge the banking industry. Digital Economy Outlook. January 2017, 
pp. 4-6. BBVA Research. <https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/DEO_Jan17_Cap1.pdf>. 
4.2.2 Credit
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From the perspective of financial stability, improved credit scoring models may reduce the 
credit risk of financial institutions. Nevertheless, the impact of new models must be 
carefully assessed along a significant period of time, particularly when credit is extended 
to previously excluded segments. Regarding operational risks, the use of more personal 
data and the greater reliance on processing technologies and algorithms must be taken 
into consideration. 
New credit scoring models also raise a number of challenges for consumer protection. First, 
the processing of personal data has to be properly authorised by the consumer, as well as 
being subject to high-level privacy and security standards. Second, consumers might be 
unfairly excluded from access to credit as a result of outdated or inaccurate data or due to 
incorrect inferences being made by algorithms.14 In addition, although big data technologies 
and algorithms reduce human biases and force decisions onto a more reliable empirical 
foundation, they might also introduce more complex types of discrimination against certain 
social groups. To address all these challenges, providers must be subject to requirements on 
the design of algorithms and the automation of decisions, and consumers must be empowered 
with transparency and recourse rights. 
Lending marketplaces 
Lending or crowdfunding marketplaces have entered into the credit business with a 
completely different business model from that used by banks and other credit providers. 
Instead of providing credit themselves, with their own capital or through financial 
intermediation, crowdfunding platforms connect savers and borrowers and facilitate them 
to directly reach credit agreements. Information and communication technologies have 
facilitated these direct interactions between individual agents by significantly lowering 
transaction costs (search, bargaining, etc.). Formally, the European Banking Authority 
(EBA) defines lending-based crowdfunding as “open calls to the wider public by fund 
seekers through a third party, typically an on-line platform, to raise funds for a project or 
for personal purposes, in the form of a loan agreement, with a promise to repay with (or in 
certain cases without) interest”.15
In general, digital platforms introduce efficiency gains in the markets where they operate 
by lowering transaction costs and internalising the externalities between the two sides 
of the market that they connect (e.g. borrowers and savers). As a particular type of 
digital platform, lending marketplaces can also lead to these benefits. However, for this 
to be the case, it is essential for them to be able to successfully address the information 
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers and hence mitigate moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems. In any case, successful crowdfunding platforms may offer 
an alternative to traditional bank credit and hence increase competition in some 
segments of the financing market, or even extend the market to previously underserved 
consumers. 
Although the amount of credit issued through crowdfunding platforms has rapidly grown 
in the last decade, it still represents a very small share of total credit volumes. Therefore, 
14  European Banking Association (2016). Discussion paper on innovative uses of consumer data by financial 
institutions (EBA/DP/2016/01). <https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1455508/EBA-DP-2016-01+DP
+on+innovative+uses+of+consumer+data+by+financial+institutions.pdf>.
15  European Banking Association (2015). Opinion of the European Banking Authority on lending-based crowdfunding 
(EBA/Op/2015/03). <https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/983359/EBA-Op-2015-03+(EBA+Opinion+
on+lending+based+Crowdfunding).pdf>.
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the impact of crowdlending on financial stability is still limited. However, if it is not 
appropriately regulated and supervised, and high growth rates remain in the future, it could 
become relevant to financial stability. In particular, systemic risks could arise due to the 
interconnections between lending marketplaces and financial institutions, some of which 
are already participating as investors in the crowdlending market. Marketplace lending 
should be monitored as part of the so-called “shadow banking” activity, which is generally 
defined as “credit intermediation that involves entities and activities fully or partially outside 
the regular banking system.”16
From the perspective of consumer protection, marketplace lending involves a number of 
risks for both lenders and borrowers that the regulatory framework has to mitigate. Credit 
and liquidity risks, lack of information or misleading information, and the operational 
continuity of platforms are some of the most relevant risks. Moreover, AML/CFT requirements 
must ensure that crowdfunding platforms are not used for illicit purposes. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning the challenges associated with its business model. The 
immediate issue is whether the platforms can find the funding to back future lending at 
the same kind of clip. Attracting additional money is crucial because the companies’ 
revenues are increasingly reliant on new lending. Platforms receive as much as 90 per cent 
of their fees on new loans, rather than from existing customers. Without new loans, revenue 
would plunge. The original P2P model, which matched retail investors with retail borrowers, 
was straightforward. But platforms struggled to find enough cash from small investors to 
cope with the rampant demand for credit. So they turned to institutional investors – and 
increasingly to banks that would repackage loan portfolios in the form of securitisations –. 
Moreover, as Mark Carney recently highlighted, “how stable this funding will prove through-
the-cycle is not yet clear, as the sector’s underwriting standards, and lenders’ tolerance to 
losses, have not been tested by a downturn.”17
Taking deposits from the general public is a highly standardised and regulated activity, 
limited to bank-licensed institutions. This has made deposit products relatively immune 
from technological changes, particularly when compared to payment or credit products. 
Nevertheless, competition in deposits – and particularly on current accounts – has 
increased due to the entrance into the market of new digital-only banks, usually referred to 
as neobanks. Compared to incumbents, these neobanks benefit from greater agility and 
efficiency, due to the absence of legacy infrastructures and physical distribution networks. 
In some countries, regulatory authorities have facilitated the emergence of these new 
banking players. For instance, the UK’s Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) jointly launched a “Bank Start-up Unit” in January 2016 
to provide information and support to newly authorised banks and to those planning to 
apply for a banking licence. Previously, in April 2013, they had introduced a “mobilisation” 
route – also known as “authorisation with restrictions” – to help start-ups in the process of 
becoming fully operational banks.
Increased competition in deposits benefits consumers and creates incentives for financial 
institutions to gain efficiency. However, from the perspective of financial stability, it may 
add pressure on the profitability of banks – as a result of lower margins – and could 
16  Fraile, A,, Romero, A. & Segovia, A.I., Turning the spotlight on shadow banking: pros and cons of the darkness, 
Digital Economy Outlook, January 2017, pp. 10-12, BBVA Research. <https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/DEO_Jan17_Cap31.pdf>. 
17  Carney, M. (2017) “The Promise of FinTech – Something New Under the Sun?”, <http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2017/speech956.pdf>.
4.2.3 Deposits 
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increase the volatility of deposits. Regarding consumer protection and AML/CFT, neobanks 
are subject to the standard rules and requirements. 
The use of algorithms to determine trading decisions has grown considerably in a number 
of financial markets (notably equity and foreign exchange markets), amid advances in 
computing power and the speed of information processing. The Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) defines automated trading as a trading technology in which order and 
trading decisions are made electronically and autonomously.18 High-frequency trading 
(HFT) is a subset of automated or algorithmic trading that has become particularly 
common. In HFT, orders are submitted and trades executed at high speed and a very tight 
intraday inventory position is maintained.19 These strategies benefit from quickly processing 
of information on market conditions and from the ability to react instantaneously to such 
information. Estimates suggest that HFT currently accounts for up to three-quarters of 
equity trading volumes and around 40% of FX.20
HFT may improve market efficiency by lowering transaction costs, helping price discovery 
and increasing the diversity of market participants. However, it has complex implications for 
financial stability, given the heterogeneous externalities that it introduces for other market 
participants.21 For instance, HFT may increase volatility in stressed market conditions. 
Algorithmic traders are usually more active in periods of low volatility, but they may suddenly 
withdraw liquidity in periods of disruption, when it is needed most (see footnote 20). Indeed, 
some “flash crashes” have been held to stem from black-box trading combined with high-
frequency trading. 
Other implications for financial stability arise from the increased “self-reflexivity of markets” 
– price changes are increasingly driven by prices themselves – and the risk of crowding-
out traditional committed market-makers, whose presence is particularly necessary in 
adverse market conditions. These market-makers may migrate their activities to other trading 
venues if they perceive they are at a disadvantage with respect to high-frequency traders. A 
final implication for financial stability is that market infrastructures must be prepared to 
deal with the surging speed of messaging and trading (see footnote 21). 
From the perspective of investor protection, common or retail participants may be harmed 
by some of these trading strategies. Indeed, some HFT tactics may be designed to obscure 
their actual trading intent, which might increase the risk of market manipulation. In general, 
preserving the integrity of the financial system faces new challenges in the context of 
automated and high-frequency trading. 
Digital channels 
The basis of all the changes has been the development of digital channels (mobile apps, 
web pages, etc.), which are increasingly gaining relevance in the relationship of consumers 
with financial services, particularly for accessing information and conducting operations. 
18  BIS Markets Committee (2011), High-frequency trading in the foreign exchange market, Basel: BIS. <http://
www.bis.org/publ/mktc05.pdf>.
19  BIS Markets Committee (2016). Electronic trading in fixed income markets, Basel: BIS. <http://www.bis.org/
publ/mktc07.pdf>.
20  Carney, M. (2017). The Promise of FinTech – Something New Under the Sun?, [Speech] Deutsche Bundesbank 
G20 conference on “Digitising finance, financial inclusion and financial literacy”. Wiesbaden, 25 January, 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2017/speech956.pdf>.
21  European Central Bank (2016). Financial Stability Review, ECB. May 2016, pp. 54-56, <https://www.ecb.europa.
eu/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201605.en.pdf>.
4.2.4 Investment
4.3  DISTRIBUTION AND 
CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
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Due to automation and economies of scale, digital channels allow financial institutions to 
gain efficiency in comparison to branch networks or even telephone channels. In terms of 
financial stability, they change the nature of some operational risks from physical to cyber 
security, and increase the relevance of technological resilience and continuity. 
Digital channels allow firms to control more directly and retain traceability of any information 
they provide to consumers. In non-digital channels, communication with customers can 
suffer from human biases or errors that it is difficult for firms to identify and avoid. Therefore, 
new digital channels may contribute to enhancing consumer protection by improving 
information transparency and accuracy. Nevertheless, they also introduce new security risks. 
When digital channels are used to acquire and onboard customers, new challenges arise for 
anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. Traditionally, the identity of 
new customers was verified by banks’ employees, face-to-face, against national identity 
documents. Fully digital onboarding processes rely on new methods of identity verification, 
such as video conferences, e-ID documents or biometric solutions. As in general with digital 
channels, these solutions may lead to cost savings in the onboarding of new customers, 
particularly when fully automated methods – without human intervention – are used. However, 
the technologies employed have to be robust and reliable enough to minimise AML risks, as 
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
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well as the potential risks to consumer protection (fraud, identity theft, privacy) and the 
operational risks related with the increasing reliance on technology. 
Automated financial advice 
Beyond the digitisation of distribution and customer relationship channels, another area 
of innovation is the automation of financial advice, which is usually referred to as “robo 
advice”. An increasing number of firms are providing advice to consumers without 
– or with limited – human intervention, making use of computer-based algorithms and/or 
decision trees. According to the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs), this automation of advice is currently more prevalent for securities than for 
banking products.22 
Automation leads to significant economies of scale and can therefore decrease the marginal 
cost of providing financial advice. These efficiency gains make financial advice accessible 
to previously excluded or underserved consumers, which in turn will have access to a wider 
range of financial products. Moreover, the independent intermediation of “robo advice” 
services might increase competition between the providers of financial products, creating 
incentives for further efficiency gains in the financial system. 
From the perspective of financial stability, automation tools involve technological and 
cyber risks that have to be included into the framework of operational risks. Indeed, 
faults or errors in automated tools might affect a large number of customers and 
increase the exposure of firms to legal and reputational risks. Moreover, the extension 
of automated advice could lead to increased market volatility and procyclicality. 
If automated advice services are based on similar algorithms, a significant number of 
customers may end up making similar investment decisions. Depending on its size, this 
herding effect might lead to losses for consumers, trigger reputational risks and even 
have systemic consequences.
For consumers, the ESAs have identified several risks from “robo advice” services.23 Some 
risks are related to consumers having limited access to information or limited ability to 
process that information or seek clarifications. This might lead consumers to make unsuitable 
financial or investment decisions. Other risks are related to flaws in the functioning of the 
automated tool, due to biases, errors, hacking or manipulation of the algorithm. Moreover, if 
the use of automated tools becomes widespread, ‘herding effects’ might lead to consumer 
detriment, as previously explained. On the positive side, automation avoids human biases 
and eases the traceability of the advice provided, which may help consumers to enforce their 
rights.
“Robo-advice” services present different degrees of automation and human intervention, 
which indeed condition the intensity of the risks that have been explained. An extreme 
level of automation, that goes further than simple advice, is the automated management 
of financial assets. The risks involved in these services are similar in nature to the ones in 
the automated advice, but usually greater. 
22  Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities [2016]. Report on automation in financial advice. EBA 
<https://esas-joint-committee.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/EBA%20BS%202016%20422%20
%28JC%20SC%20CPFI%20Final%20Report%20on%20automated%20advice%20tools%29.pdf>.
23  Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (2015). Joint Committee Discussion Paper on 
automation in financial advice (JC 2015 080). EBA <https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1299866/JC
+2015+080+Discussion+Paper+on+automation+in+financial+advice.pdf>.
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New intermediaries 
Finally, another relevant change in the distribution of financial services is the disintermediation 
of the relationship between customers and providers. Traditionally, customers had a direct, 
close – and usually exclusive – relationship with their bank. Indeed, for the majority of retail 
clients, their bank was the only point of contact for any financial need. Nowadays, a number 
of new players are offering different types of “intermediation services”: account information 
services which, apart from aggregating data from different bank accounts, provide 
personalised suggestions; comparison sites which allow consumers to shop around and 
look for the financial product that best suits their needs; or marketplaces in which consumers 
can directly sign up to products from different providers. Crowdfunding platforms constitute 
a particular type of the latter, but their particular impact on the financial system has already 
been covered. The new EU Payment Services Directive (PSD2) will facilitate the flourishing 
of intermediation services since it will allow customers to directly share their bank account 
data with third-party payment service providers. 
Intermediation services increase the comparability of financial products and services and 
lower the cost of switching between providers. Therefore, they promote more intense 
competition between financial services providers and can lead to efficiency gains in the 
financial system. 
From the perspective of financial stability, this increased competition might increase 
pressure on the profitability of financial institutions, by lowering margins and threatening 
the existing cross-selling and cross-subsidy strategies. Moreover, these new services, 
together with advice and automation tools, can contribute to increase the volatility of 
deposits and exacerbate liquidity risks and bank runs. 
The impact of intermediation services on the concentration of risks is complex. On the one 
hand, comparison sites or marketplaces could reduce the cost of customer acquisition for 
new or small players. However, more intense competition could lead to market concentration 
on a reduced number of players that would be able to benefit from large economies of 
scale. This effect is likely to be prevalent for highly commoditisable products, and might 
lead to increased concentration in financial stability risks. 
Account aggregators, comparison sites or marketplaces can empower consumers and help 
them to have more control over their personal finances. However, they also raise new challenges 
for consumer protection. For instance, preserving the protection of personal data in a framework 
in which more players have access to such data, ensuring accuracy of the information provided 
to customers and requiring intermediaries to properly disclose their incentives to recommend 
particular products or services. Finally, regarding AML/CFT, there must be a clear assignment of 
liabilities when marketplaces allow customers to directly sign up to products from different 
providers.
As mentioned before, innovation and digitalisation offer an unprecedented opportunity for 
the financial sector to improve its efficiency, better manage its risks and provide more value 
to customers. Furthermore, the introduction of digital innovations benefits the whole financial 
system, and these innovations improve the quality and variety of banking services, facilitate 
risk sharing, complete the market, and improve allocative efficiency.24 However innovations 
24  Shalhoub, L. (2017). Bahrain aspires to become a FinTech hub. Arab News. 1 March 2017 <http://www.arabnews.
com/node/1061351/business-economy>.
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do not arise in isolation; they require an appropriate environment to promote them. Among 
all the deterrents to innovation, environmental uncertainty is probably the most important 
one, and regulation is a key ingredient of this habitat.25 This is because the successful 
introduction of something new into the market already has an intrinsic high degree of 
uncertainty. In some dimensions there are explicit prohibitions, but in many others, it is 
precisely the absence of a specific regulatory and supervisory framework which risks stifling 
innovation. There are projects that do not fit squarely into the existing regulatory framework. 
This means that they face an uncertainty which is either delaying projects (awaiting the 
approval of the authorities) or blocking them before their launch onto the market to avoid 
regulatory risks, as a result of the legal uncertainty and lack of trust being generated. 
Tackling the above mentioned regulatory challenges appropriately requires a breadth of 
vision on the part of all concerned, both public authorities and the private sector, with a 
view to taking advantage of these opportunities, overcoming the obstacles that currently 
exist. The best way forward is to adopt a holistic approach to seeking a balance between 
the promotion of the new digital value propositions with protection against the risks 
involved. How can we find the balance between both worlds?
As shown in Figure 5, there are two extreme scenarios:
— On the one hand, one could think of a self-regulatory approach where the 
financial institutions and new players from FinTech set their own rules of 
operation and control based on the risk appetite that each is willing to assume. 
In this environment, the private sector would have a high capacity for 
innovation, but without a doubt would take on more risks.
 This approach has a significant handicap. The increased competition due to 
the entrance of new digital native players adds pressure on the banks’ profi-
tability. The absence of a standard regulation may imply that weaker banks 
and new competitors simply have little incentives to comply with their self-
imposed rules. In the absence of regulation, the unique incentive is the market 
discipline. However, market discipline, understood as an “external control”, 
cannot be seen as an effective tool for limiting excessive risk-taking in an 
25  Edquist, C., & Chaminade, C. (2006). Industrial policy from a systems-of-innovation perspective. EIB papers, 11(1), 
pp. 108-132, <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/44862/1/51566457X.pdf>.
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
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environment of low regulation and supervision. In this way, the system would 
be taking on a high risk in terms of financial stability and consumer protection 
that lay beyond the control of the authorities.
— On the other hand, the opposite approach is an environment of intense 
regulation and supervision where all new developments must be covered by 
pre-existing regulation and approval processes, with supervisory monitoring 
on each case. Undoubtedly, this approach significantly reduces new risks, 
but the speed and degree of development of the system would lag well behind 
the demands of customers. 
Recognising that both alternatives pose advantages but also disadvantages, there is a 
need to find a compromise solution that is consistent with the current regulatory framework 
the life cycle of innovation, with the participation of public and private institutions and 
taking into account the idiosyncrasies of each country. In fact, the financial sector is highly 
regulated and there is a strong link with the national environment, as all players must be 
authorised to operate in only certain jurisdictions, but are not automatically allowed to 
provide services in other countries. Besides, we must understand that the level of 
bancarisation and the maturity of the financial sector varies among regions. Finally, there 
are other factors that could affect the introduction of new services, such as the existence 
of venture funding, the potential market size, and the literacy level of the population. All of 
these issues must be taken into account when deploying any mechanism to improve the 
financial system, as some new ideas will fit some countries or regions but would not be 
suitable for others. However, although there is no magic formula to foster foolproof 
innovation, there are different approaches with some elements in common which are being 
introduced in different countries, and all of them agree that it is of paramount importance 
to improve the relationship between regulators and the industry. These different paths 
have some common practices which can be seen in the more detailed analysis below.
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
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On the one hand, the private sector needs to have well-defined policies on the control and 
management of technological risks (cybersecurity, data protection, etc.) associated with the 
new value propositions. These policies must be integrated into the governance of the entity 
in order to set down and measure the risk appetite that it is acceptable to take on. It is 
therefore not only necessary to know and understand the risks that the new digital environment 
poses, but there also needs to be an internal policy of measurement, setting of limits and 
monitoring of technological risks that will allow the entity to perform a self-assessment of the 
risks involved in adapting to this new change.
On the other hand, the public sector is currently being challenged to find ways to support 
innovation, in order to alleviate uncertainty, sum up the efforts of the different agents while 
retaining knowledge that can be used to improve their regulatory tasks. As a response to this 
demand, a significant number of regulatory and supervisory authorities from different countries 
are already launching initiatives to promote digital financial ecosystems. Those initiatives may 
be grouped into three categories: A) an innovation hub, B) a regulatory sandbox, and C) new 
skills and collaborative mindset.
Overall, these initiatives allow authorities to have early and direct knowledge of these 
innovations, which is essential for the regulatory and supervisory framework to be kept up-to-
date and to face any new challenges effectively. The main characteristics of the three initiatives 
will be described below.
Innovation hub 
Regulation is usually regarded as one of the main stoppers of financial innovation. This 
perception is based on the strict obligations to provide financial services, and on the 
conservative interpretation of some of those principles. In order to become more accessible, 
financial authorities are implementing different initiatives to move closer to the industry and 
to provide more efficient and timely response to its needs. 
Regarding this issue, it is important to mention the first steps taken by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA)26 in the UK, which in 2014 launched a specific programme called Project 
Innovate that has resulted, among other things, in an Innovation Hub which gives direct support 
to innovative companies and organises activities to bring the FCA closer to the innovation 
ecosystem. In Spain, in December 2016 the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National 
Stock Market Commision, CNMV) launched a similar FinTech Hub initiative pursuing the same 
objectives. Additionally, a Technical Committee on Financial Innovation has been created with 
the participation of the Spanish Treasury, the Bank of Spain, the CNMV, the Dirección General 
de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones (General Directorate of Insurance and Pension Funds, 
DGSFP), the Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (Spanish Agency for Data Protection, 
AEPD) and the Comisión de Prevención de Blanqueo de Capitales e Infracciones Monetarias 
(Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offense, SEPBLAC) that 
meets regularly to discuss issues related to technological innovation in financial services.27
This concept of the Innovation Hub represents a contact point for regulators and industry 
to share common views and gather advice to better navigate legal issues. It can be a 
26  Financial Conduct Authority (2016). Fintech and innovative businesses. FCA (webpage). <https://www.fca.org.
uk/firms/fintech-and-innovative-businesses>.
27  This concept of the Innovation Hub is also followed by other States, there are examples of established initiatives 
like the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) FinTech Lab, the Australian Securities & Investments Commission 
(ASIC) Fintech Hub or the United States Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) Innovation Office.
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digital service or a physical venue and represents a contact point for companies and public 
services. The idea is to collaborate in the initial phases of new value propositions by 
providing a common space in which to exchange needs, thoughts, and ideas. 
Setting up a structure to understand and encourage financial innovation brings further 
benefits, like the possibility of establishing links abroad with other hubs in order to enlarge 
the geographical scope of those initiatives. At this point, it is worth highlighting two 
illustrative examples of how proactive regulators are signing cross-border agreements. 
The Singapore MAS28 has signed cooperation agreements with the United Kingdom, 
South Korea, Switzerland, and India. And the Australian ASIC29 already has agreements 
with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Kenya. These agreements focus on helping 
business to expand to other geographical areas safely and easily. Additionally, there is an 
interest in the exchange of knowledge in order to better understand the new trends and 
how they may impact existing regulations. Although this exchange of know-how is still at 
a very early stage, future evolutions might potentially lead to the creation of a legal figure 
similar to the Financial Services Passport that already exists in the European Union. 
Although the recent proliferation of these hubs shows that it is an interesting practice, other 
authorities have just improved their access channel without launching a concrete innovation 
hub yet, such as Germany, which provides information and a contact for FinTech through the 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin),30 or Dubai,31 which has taken its first steps 
with a dedicated portal that provides guidance to FinTech participants, although it expects to 
evolve into a deeper collaboration, building strategic partnerships with relevant stakeholders. 
In the same field, some authorities have entered a period of reflection to identify new channels 
to interact with the private sector and to accompany them in the digital transformation journey. 
A clear example is France,32 which is aiming at improving its legislation and, simultaneously, 
creating better communication channels to cater to industry enquiries. The French financial 
authorities are aiming to provide what they call “FinTech-friendly regulation”, that eases the 
requirements to start a FinTech business and a programme to allow fast-track registration and 
authorisation for foreign start-ups. This programme has been boosted by the creation of 
several incubators and the FinTech, Innovation and Competitiveness (FIC) division within the 
Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF). 
All in all, it is important to note that different players could have diverse needs based on 
the different levels of technological development and risks. Therefore, there may be 
approaches focused only on new entrants and start-ups, but most initiatives launched by 
most advanced authorities are intended to serve all stakeholders. A comprehensive 
approach with different options is probably the best approach, as it will benefit the whole 
ecosystem and ensure that there are positive spillovers to all participants. 
28  Monetary Authority of Singapore (2016). Fintech Regulatory Sandbox Guidelines. Singapore: Singapore Government. 
<http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/Smart%20Financial%20Centre/Sandbox/FinTech%20Regulatory%20
Sandbox%20Guidelines.pdf>.
29  ASIC (2016) Innovation Hub. ASIC (webpage). <http://asic.gov.au/for-business/your-business/innovation-hub/
licensing-and-regulation/>.
30  BaFin (2016) Company start-ups and fintech companies. BaFin (webpage). <https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/
FinTech/fintech_node_en.html>.
31  Dubai International Financial Centre (2017). Dubai International Financial Centre Launches ‘FinTech Hive at 
DIFC’, the Region’s First FinTech Accelerator, Supported by Accenture. Dubai International Financial Centre 
Pfress Relase, 10January 2017. <https://www.difc.ae/news/difc-launches-fintech-hive-difc-regions-first-fintech-
accelerator-supported-accenture>.
32  ACPR (2016) La conférence de l’ACPR. Paris, 25 November 2016. <https://acpr.banque-france.fr/fileadmin/user_
upload/acp/Communication/Conferences/20161125-Presentation-Fintech.pdf>.
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Regulatory sandboxes 
The new digital landscape poses significant challenges for authorities, as its embryonic stage 
makes it difficult to determine how it will be affected by the current regulatory framework and, 
therefore, makes it is difficult to decide whether specific initiatives should be allowed or not. 
As a response to these concerns, authorities could take a conservative approach denying the 
authorisation in order to preserve the financial system. As an alternative, the creation of a 
supervised safe environment for testing with real customers before entering the market 
emerges an option that allows the leveraging of innovation and systemic stability. This 
experimental space involves a close control provided by the financial authorities with a 
regulatory relief for all participants, while ensuring protection for customers and for the 
economy as a whole. This solution was provided by the British FCA in 2015 with the creation 
of the Regulatory Sandboxes, an idea that has attracted the interest of several organisations 
and that has recently led to the emergence of similar initiatives in other countries.
In order to improve the conditions that can lead to innovation, the regulatory sandboxes 
propose an space where regulators and entities are better able to grasp each other’s point 
of view, strengthening communication and increasing common understanding, and thus 
contributing to a significant reduction of bottlenecks. It is of interest to mention that their 
implementation can add significant value to regulators, consumers and entities, by allowing 
them to understand how the ecosystem works, the opportunities as well as the risks 
inherent in all the initiatives. Firstly, companies are expected to be keener on trying out 
new products and services that could potentially improve competition and ultimately 
benefit consumers. Secondly, the regulatory framework can also benefit from the use 
of these sandboxes, as they permit a better understanding of the costs, benefits and risks of 
new propositions. And, lastly, consumers will enjoy the benefits of efficiency gains and 
obtain access to more competitive financial services.
In order to achieve a common definition of regulatory sandboxes, some degree of 
homogeneity is needed in the setting of criteria to enter this controlled space, in the internal 
operations and, finally, in the conditions under which the exit will take place. There are 
common attributes in all of the sandboxes that have already being released or are being 
planned. The nature of this concept makes it an exceptional process that should not be 
used as a shortcut to avoid regulation. 
— First of all, the project should be innovative. The rationale behind this concept 
is that if a similar product has already been introduced in the market, there is 
previous knowledge of how it is being affected by the current regulatory 
framework and, therefore, allowing a sandbox would work against level 
playing field principles. However, one question arises regarding the way we 
define innovation. Although there is no single definition, we understand that it 
is “something new introduced into the market”. 
— Secondly, while in the sandbox, there is a strict monitoring by the authority in 
charge, which will be closely following all the improvements and helping when 
required. For its part, the company that has started the project must achieve 
certain milestones and implement any changes demanded by this authority. 
Thoughtfully following these procedures is vital for the success of the sandbox. 
Another key element in the sandboxes is to allow regulatory exceptions while the project 
is being tested and is still unsure what its impact will be in the current framework. 
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Nonetheless, not all geographical areas are relaxing the same requirements at this stage. 
There are examples of sandboxes that only contemplate the relief of licensing requirements, 
as is the case of the Swiss Fintech Supervisory Sandbox released in 2016, while other 
nations are open to the customisation of the set of rules that should apply, like Abu Dhabi’s 
RegLab33 programme or the creation of waivers to permit exceptions, which is one of the 
options that the FCA could provide. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that there are 
limitations for this legal alleviation: the regulation that is relaxed must fall under the sphere 
of competence of the authority in charge of the sandbox, and Anti-Money Laundering or 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism regulations should fully apply along with consumer 
protection safeguards that need to be applied in order to ensure that the testing is not 
done at the expense of individuals rights. 
Additionally there are different views among authorities regarding who should participate 
in the regulatory sandbox. Although most initiatives are open to all players, Hong Kong’s 
Fintech Supervisory Sandbox34 has started conducting pilot schemes only for banks while 
the Indonesian35 plans to provide support for developers are targeted more to new entrants. 
In all cases, the need to establish a sandbox must be carefully reviewed on a case-by-case 
basis, taking into account the potential benefits for consumers, regulators and companies. 
This “on demand” approach arises from the fact that innovation is uncertain and there is 
no information about what potential business models or products might require this 
service. All in all, limiting the different options to a single list of potential use cases could 
deter future projects. 
Finally, we must underscore that the regulatory sandboxes concept is quite recent, and new 
initiatives are currently being deployed. Nevertheless, there are more mature models that 
have already entered their first cohort of projects. Good examples come from the United 
Kingdom,36 Singapore37 and Australia.38 Other initiatives are currently in the definition 
process of how these safe spaces should be, like Bahrain39 and Kenya.40 In the near future, 
we are likely to see the emergence of new regulatory sandboxes, as this idea has already 
captured the interest of several organisations and authorities. 
New skills and collaborative mindset 
To achieve success in launching regulatory sandboxes and innovation hubs requires two 
prerequisites: first, authorities should embark on the establishing of a transparent and 
33  Abu Dhabi Global Market (2016). Abu Dhabi Global Market Sets Out Proposal for FinTech Regulatory Framework 
in the UAE. Abu Dhabi Global Market Press Release, 10 May 2016. <https://www.adgm.com/mediacentre/press-
releases/abu-dhabi-global-market-sets-out-proposal-for-fintech-regulatory-framework-in-the-uae/>.
34  Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2017). Fintech Facilitation Office (FFO) Hong Kong Monetary Authority (webpage), 
<http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-financial-centre/fintech-facilitation-office-ffo.shtml>.
35  Bank Indonesia launches fintech office. (2016) Outlaw. 21 November 2016, <https://www.out-law.com/en/
articles/2016/november/bank-indonesia-launches-fintech-office/>.
36  Financial Conduct Authority (2016). Fintech and innovative businesses. FCA (webpage). <https://www.fca.org.
uk/firms/fintech-and-innovative-businesses>.
37  Monetary Authority of Singapore (2016). Fintech Regulatory Sandbox Guidelines. Singapore: Singapore Government. 
<http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/Smart%20Financial%20Centre/Sandbox/FinTech%20Regulatory%20
Sandbox%20Guidelines.pdf>.
38  ASIC (2016) Innovation Hub. ASIC (webpage). <http://asic.gov.au/for-business/your-business/innovation-hub/
licensing-and-regulation/>.
39  Shalhoub, L. (2017). Bahrain aspires to become a FinTech hub. Arab News. 1 March 2017, <http://www.arabnews.
com/node/1061351/business-economy>.
40  Capital Markets Authority (2017). Kenyan and Australian regulators sign agreement to support fintech innovation. 
Press Release 21 October 2016, <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2016-
releases/16-359mr-kenyan-and-australian-regulators-sign-agreement-to-support-fintech-innovation/>.
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collaborative environment with all stakeholders, and, second, authorities should endeavour 
to increase the knowledge and capacity of their staff in relation to digital and technical 
innovations.
Collaboration among all public sector authorities is paramount. The speed and complexity 
of technological innovation demands regular knowledge sharing and close dialogue with 
other stakeholders, such as market participants, supervisors and legislators. In this regard, 
given the organisational complexity of some organisms, it is desirable that within them 
there should be a figure responsible for ensuring the coordination and consistency of the 
institution as a whole in regard to all the activities relating to innovation and digital 
transformation.
In this strategy, it is also essential to have active involvement by the various private and public 
actors. In the case of the private sector, it is obvious that all stakeholders should be involved 
– banks, technology companies, start-ups, etc. – while preserving a level playing field for all 
them. As regards the public sector, the collaboration should be extended to all authorities and 
not only to supervisors and policy-makers. This would include market authorities, financial 
supervisor, AML watchdogs, financial and industrial ministry, etc.
For this dialogue and cooperation to be effective, regulators and supervisors need to 
invest in new skills (such as expertise in cybersecurity or big data). It is important for the 
institutions to build up a solid base of knowledge to allow them to understand and manage 
the types of issues that could arise in the new environment in the most efficient manner 
possible, as often these are new topics for which there is simply no previous experience to 
call upon. As the De Nederlandsche Bank highlighted recently,41 this can be achieved 
through training of staff and a targeted recruitment policy. 
Developing new skills and capabilities would also allow authorities to maximise the new 
opportunities that technological innovation offers. Supervisors may benefit from the 
new Regtech solutions, which use new technology propositions in the context of regulatory 
monitoring, reporting and compliance.
An ecosystem in which suppliers and authorities are in permanent contact, and in which 
the latter are aware of technological innovations at an early stage, will lead to a rejuvenated 
framework of regulation and supervision which will facilitate innovation, while addressing 
the risks in the most effective way possible.
The transformation of the sector will necessarily produce occasional errors that will be 
committed as a normal result of an innovative process in which not just companies, but 
also regulators and supervisors, will be leading the way. In this regard, it is extremely 
important that the answers given by the authorities to these unintended consequences are 
proportionate. This will mean that financial institutions can continue making progress 
without fear in the innovation process that is so needed by the sector.
Banks have always managed to make the most of technology to improve their efficiency 
and the service provided to their customers, but they now face a new wave of innovation 
with much wider implications for financial services. Digital disruption may help the financial 
sector to survive the pressures of low growth, waning profitability and tough regulation, 
and to solidly re-establish trust among its customers and reputation within society. If 
41  De Nederlandsche Bank (2017). Technological innovation and the Dutch financial sector. 
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banks can offer a better user experience, they will again come closer to customer demands 
and needs. To satisfy their aspirations and bring them the opportunity of this new age, 
since they are already exposed to the digital transformation in all aspects of their lives, 
banking must experience its reinvention. 
Despite the aforementioned acknowledged benefits, developments in technology and 
new market dynamics pose challenges in financial stability, consumer protection and 
integrity of the financial sector – key objectives of regulators and supervisors –. From the 
perspective of financial stability, operational IT and cyber security risks have become a 
key concern among authorities. Cyber threats may create huge economic damage, but 
also if there is lack of confidence in the safety and security of digital technologies, the 
adoption of new technologies will falter even if they offer substantial benefits. Additionally, 
automated tools and services, such as electronic trading platforms and robo advisors, 
may increase the risk of market volatility and procyclicality. New players are often subject 
to laxer regulation and supervision, and increased competition adds pressure on the 
banks’ profitability. Incumbent banks need to change radically; otherwise they are at risk 
of disappearing as we know them today. 
From the perspective of consumer protection, the application of new technologies involves 
new security risks, and greater access to and use of customers’ data increases the relevance 
of personal data protection. Moreover, some risks arise from automated tools, but they also 
allow for more control and traceability of the customer relationship. Finally, regarding the 
integrity of the financial system, the anonymity of virtual currencies and the greater speed 
of payments entail new risks related to money laundering and terrorism financing.
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration.
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The aforementioned new risks are not fully covered by the traditional supervisory approach 
(i.e. capital or liquidity requirements). So regulators and supervisors must tackle them 
without hindering the transformation of the financial industry. It is worth highlighting that 
new digital proposition is at an early stage and it certainly does not pose significant 
financial stability and consumer risks so far. However, the exponential nature of the new 
digital infrastructures, business and distribution models and customer solutions allows 
them to go from “too small to care to too big to fail” in a very short period of time, requiring 
authorities to have a far-reaching and anticipated perspective. 
In this context, further regulatory and supervisory work still lies ahead of us to fully 
capture the potential of digital innovation and to prepare the financial system for future 
crises. In this regards, it is welcomed the work that the IMF High Level Advisory Group 
on Fintech the FSB Fintech Working Group have been carried out since last year. 
Although there is not a magic regulatory and supervisory formula, any solution should 
rest on four key pillars: 
— The private sector needs to have well-defined policies on the control and 
management of new technological risks. 
— Knowledge centers and innovation hubs are key contact points for regulators 
and industry to share common views and gather advice to better navigate 
legal issues.
— The creation of supervised and safe pre-market testing environments, the so-
called regulatory sandboxes, emerges as an option that fosters innovation 
while preserving systemic stability.
— Authorities should work to increase the knowledge and capacity of their staff 
in relation to digital innovation, as well as develop a collaborative mindset.
To sum up, every decision that public and private stakeholders make from now on must be 
approached with a great sense of responsibility, taking into account three key guiding 
principles. First, the customer must be put at the center of any initiatives with ambition to 
succeed. Second, as future developments in technology and the competitive landscape 
remain uncertain, we need to pay special attention to the rise of new challenges. And 
finally, collaboration and communication among all stakeholders is vital in order to make 
the most of digitisation in finance, while preserving financial stability and ensuring adequate 
consumer protection.
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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND FIRM LEVERAGE. A POLICY ORIENTED SURVEY
This paper surveys the literature that studies the connection between leverage and 
executive compensation. First, we discuss the dynamics of pay-for-performance 
compensation and how to measure it. Then we study the theoretical underpinnings of how 
firm leverage may be related to the compensation structure of its executives. After 
reviewing the empirical work on the topic we survey the policy implications. We discuss 
recent work that shows positive outcomes from regulating executive compensation, but 
that raises a cautionary note: regulating leverage directly seems more efficient than 
regulating executive compensation.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a lively debate in the academic and 
policy circles about regulating executive compensation to avoid excessive firms’ leverage. 
Some countries have regulated the structure or the level of compensation, especially for 
financial firms, while others have adopted say-on-pay regimes that increase shareholder’s 
weight in the design of executive compensation.
For example, the European Union (Directive 2013/36/EU and CRDIV) has established that 
bonuses at credit institutions and investment firms cannot exceed 100% of fixed salary 
(200% if the company wins shareholder approval). The U.S. is also discussing new rules to 
curb executive compensation in financial institutions [Wall Street Journal (2016)]. Correa and 
Lel (2016) document that eleven countries have passed laws to give shareholders direct 
influence on executive compensation policies (i.e., say on pay laws). In Spain, the “Ley de 
Sociedades de Capital” regulates executive compensation.1 For public companies, the 
“Código de Buen Gobierno” approved in 2015 by the Spanish Securities and Exchange 
Commission (CNMV) recommends the use of deferred compensation and clawbacks clauses.
In this article, we discuss the literature that studies the connection between firm leverage 
and executive compensation. Our survey is selective and guided by two policy questions. 
First, we study the effects of executive compensation on firm’s leverage. We focus on 
whether the structure of compensation affects the willingness to borrow following a credit 
stimulus. Governments and central banks often try to stimulate economic activity by 
promoting credit supply. This is referred to as monetary policy’s risk-taking channel. It was 
especially important during the Great Recession because, once the policy rates hit the 
zero-lower bound, many Central Banks resorted to unconventional policies to lower banks’ 
borrowing costs and expand credit supply [Correia et al. (2016), Gambacorta and Shin 
(2016)]. The literature has focused on what types of lenders react more.2 In this article, we 
discuss papers that focus on the borrowers, which is a relatively unexplored question. This 
work can help us understand in what settings the credit expansion policies of Central 
Banks may have the maximum impact.
Second, we discuss recent work that studies when and how executive compensation 
should be regulated. The literature suggests that it may be more effective to directly limit 
leverage rather than trying to affect it indirectly by imposing limitations on executives’ 
compensation. 
1  Articles 217-220 and 529. 
2  See, for example, Dell’Ariccia, Laeven and Suárez (2017), or Jiménez et al. (2014).
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In this section, we define how the literature measures pay-for-performance compensation. 
After that, we discuss the dynamics of the structure of executive compensation. We use 
CEO and executives as synonyms. The key take-away is that pay-for-performance 
compensation has increased over time, especially since the mid-1980s. 
In the literature, the executive’s exposure to firm performance is called the pay-performance 
sensitivity. To understand better this concept, we consider a simple one period model 
inspired in Edmans and Gabaix (2016). The firm has no debt to simplify. Let S be the firm’s 
equity value at the beginning of the period. 
Let the CEO’s compensation be c=F+S, where θ denotes the CEO’s equity ownership in 
the firm. We assume risk-neutrality. In this case, the pay-performance sensitivity is θ, the 
variation in the executive’s wealth when the stock’s price changes. This measure is also 
known as the CEO’s percentage stake. Jensen and Murphy (1990) estimate this sensitivity 
as follows:
 [1]
∆ denotes the stock option’s delta. Delta measures the degree to which an option is 
exposed to shifts in the price of the underlying asset. Hall and Liebman (1998) show that 
the portfolio of unexercised stock options is the largest component in CEO’s performance-
pay sensitivity. Estimating delta for this portfolio of options can be challenging since firms 
do not typically report the features of options granted in previous years, like their maturity 
or their strike price. Shareholders can manage executives’ pay-performance sensitivity 
(the slope θ) by either granting more shares, more stock options or, in the case of options, 
through their delta. There is a positive relation between stock options’ delta and pay-
performance sensitivity. The executive’s risk exposure increases when the sensitivity 
increases. 
For risk-averse CEOs we cannot ignore the effect of firm volatility on the executive’s 
incentives. Instead of talking of the CEO’s dollar pay we should talk about her certainty 
equivalent wealth, CE. Guay (1999) decomposes the executive’s certainty equivalent 
wealth into two components:
CE = E(wealth)-risk premium                                                 [2]
When the executive is risk neutral, the second element vanishes and we converge to the 
previous analysis. Differentiating equation [2] with respect to firm risk (σ) we obtain the 
following expression:
  [3]
Guay (1999) calls the first element in equation [3],                     , the wealth effect. This effect 
operates through the non-linearity of the executive’s compensation cash flows. Three 
examples: 1) for stock options, this effect corresponds to vega, the option’s sensitivity with 
respect to the volatility of the underlying stock. Vega is positive because of the convexity 
of the option payoffs with respect to the stock price; 2) bonuses that include a compensation 
2  Definitions and Basic 
Facts
2.1 DEFINITIONS
θ =   
 Nr.  shares owned by CEO + Nr. options owned by CEO × ∆
        Nr.  shares  outstanding
∂E(wealth)
∂
∂CE   
=
   ∂E(wealth)   
–
   ∂(risk premium)
    ∂∂∂
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for outperforming certain benchmark and no (or limited) penalty in the case of 
underperformance also exhibit an option-like behaviour with respect to the volatility of firm 
cash flows; 3) in leveraged firm, common stock can be interpreted as a call option on the 
firm’s cash flows with debt’s face value as the strike price [Black and Scholes (1973) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. 
The second element in equation [3],                           , is called the risk-aversion effect. 
When shareholders increase pay-performance sensitivity (θ in equation [1]), risk averse 
executives will demand a premium for bearing more firm-specific, non-diversifiable risk. 
Equation [3] says that the size of this premium varies with the executive’s sensitivity with 
respect to firm risk. This sensitivity is higher for non-diversified executives (i.e., when the 
CEO’s compensation is a larger fraction of her total wealth) and for more risk averse 
executives. 
In the case of options, Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) show theoretically that, due to 
the risk-aversion effect, higher stock volatility may actually decrease the value of options 
when options are deep enough in the money (i.e., when the price-to-strike price is large 
enough). This theoretical argument can be extended to any convex, option-like 
compensation structure, like common stock from a levered firm.
Moreover, there are several other features of executive compensation that could affect 
firms’ risk taking. Like trading, option or maturity restrictions, market vs. stock performance 
or severance packages. For instance, severance packages, combined with stock options 
can increase the vega of the executive compensation. 
The literature typically considers two measures of pay-performance sensitivity. The first 
measure is the percentage stake or Jensen-Murphy measure. It corresponds to θ in 
equation [1]. This measure captures the dollar variation of the CEO’s wealth for a given 
dollar variation in firm’s value. In a seminal paper, Jensen and Murphy (1990) study the 
compensation of CEOs in large publicly traded U.S. firms for the 1974-1986 period. They 
estimate that CEOs percentage stake is very low. On average, executive compensation 
increases only $3.25 for every $1,000 increase in firm’s value, which denotes very low 
levels of management ownership. They conclude: “Corporate America pays its CEOs like 
bureaucrats”.
The second measure is the dollar equity at stake, which measures the variation in the 
CEO’s dollar pay relative to the percentage variation in firm’s value. Hall and Liebman 
(1998) calculate the dollar equity at stake among the CEOs of the largest US companies 
from 1980 to 1994. The sensitivity of the median CEO direct compensation (salary, plus 
bonuses, plus new grants of restricted stock, plus stock options) is about 0.3, meaning 
that a 10% stock return leads to 3% increase in CEO dollar compensation. However, they 
also show that the results are different when there is re-pricing of the holdings of stock 
and, especially, the stock options. Taking them into account, the sensitivity increases to 
about 3.9. In other words, a 10% stock return is associated (median value) with a 39% 
increase in the CEO’s dollar pay. This is not the pay-performance sensitivity of a 
bureaucrat!
The structure of CEO compensation is very heterogeneous across countries. Table 1, 
which comes from Fernandes et al. (2013), highlights several stark differences. For 
example, equity-based compensation has a significantly larger weight in the U.S. (39%), 
Canada (32%), and the U.K. (30%) than in the rest of the countries in the sample. 
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Table 1 shows the four key components of executive compensation: 1) Salary is fixed, 
non-contingent compensation; 2) Other components may include pension plans, insurance 
benefits and perquisites (like a club membership, for instance); 3) Bonuses are non-equity 
incentive plans based either on the board discretion or on the achievement of certain 
objectives. These objectives can be expressed in terms of accounting performance (like a 
target for earnings-per-share), market performance, or the relative ranking of the firm with 
respect to its peers; 4) The equity-based component includes stock option grants (at their 
Black-Scholes value) and stock grants (at their market value). 
The compensation of CEOs and board members in Spain is regulated by the Governance 
Code of Listed Companies from 2015.3 This Code follows the principle of “comply or 
explain.” It limits the use of stock and stock options to executive board members 
(recommendation #57) and specifies that variable pay in general, and stock and stock 
options in particular, must be subject to vesting period of at least three years and that the 
redemption of stock and stock options is limited to twice the value of their fixed 
remuneration (recommendation #62). 
According to the 2015 Annual Report on the Remuneration of Firm Officers, the mean total 
pay for CEOs among the 35 largest firms in the IBEX-35 was 3.05 million euros.4 Of that 
amount, 46% corresponds to salary, the equity-based compensation (including shares granted 
and the profit from exercised stock options) amounts to 38% of the total compensation.
3  Código de Buen Gobierno de las Sociedades Cotizadas, CNMV (2015).
4  Informe Anual de las Remuneraciones de los Consejeros de las Sociedades Cotizadas, CNMV (2015).
SOURCE: Fernandes et al. (2013).
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Chart 1 from Frydman and Saks (2010) shows that the large weight of equity based 
compensation in the U.S. is a recent fact. Until the 1960s, equity-based compensation 
was rare among U.S. companies. Executive compensation consisted basically of fixed 
salary and cash bonuses. Since the 1960s, stock grants started to become usual in long-
term incentive plans. The big “revolution” in CEO compensation came when a tax reform 
taxed stock options as capital gains at a much lower tax rate than labour income. As Chart 1 
shows, stock options increased dramatically since the 1980s.
Chart 2 from Frydman and Jenter (2010) compares the two measures of pay-for-
performance for S&P 500 firms. The right axis is the Jensen-Murphy, or percentage stake 
measure, that computes the dollar change in pay per $1,000 increase in firm’s value. The 
SOURCE: Frydman and Saks (2010).
MEDIAN TOTAL COMPENSATION AND ITS COMPONENTS, 1936-2005 CHART 1
SOURCE: Frydman and Jenter (2010).
EQUITY AT STAKE AND JENSEN-MURPHY PROXY OF PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE CHART 2
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left axis is the change in dollar pay per 1% change in firm’s value (dollar equity at stake). 
The two lines differ because of the growth in firms’ values over time. Executives tend to 
own smaller stakes in larger firms. As a result, firm’s growth leads to higher equity-at-stake 
incentives. Both measures show an increase in pay-for-performance pay over time.
In this section we survey the theoretical literature studying the theoretical underpinnings of 
how a firm’s leverage is related to the compensation structure of its executives. For a given 
level of compensation, when the variable share is larger we say that compensation is more 
convex, or has a higher pay-for-performance sensitivity.
We should mention that the literature we are reviewing in this section assumes the existence 
of an arms-length relationship between the CEO (the agent) and the compensation committee 
(representing the board and, ultimately, the shareholders). We could term this approach as 
the contractual approach. This is not the only view. Pioneered by the work of Bebchuck and 
Fried (2004), a strand of the literature challenges the arms-length assumption and argues 
that the observed contracts are not justified by firm performance or firm characteristics. This 
literature stresses rent extraction by CEOs interested in their own agendas. 
Since the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Holmstrom (1979), it is well understood 
that linking compensation to performance is a powerful instrument to align the interests of 
executives and shareholders. For example, the investment choices of under-diversified, risk 
averse executives may conflict with the interest of well-diversified shareholders. The former 
may decide to avoid risky projects with positive Net Present Value, to focus on conservative 
investments. Shareholders may encourage risk-taking by increasing the vega of their 
executives compensation. For example, by including stock options in the CEO’s compensation 
package. This is the wealth effect component discussed before in equation [3]. 
The seminal paper linking compensation structure and leverage is John and John (1993). 
In this paper, the authors study a model that incorporates a moral hazard conflict between 
shareholders and executives. Higher delta in the executive’s compensation may, as we 
have seen, align the incentives of both agents. On the other side, higher delta exacerbates 
the executive’s risk appetite resulting into a risk-shifting conflict between shareholders 
and bondholders. Bondholders will discount this conflict pushing up bond premia. To 
mitigate the extra cost of debt induced by risk-shifting, the optimal compensation contract 
will reduce pay-performance sensitivity as firm’s leverage increases. 
Contrary to the risk-shifting incentives, Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) show 
empirically that options may decrease incentives for risk-taking. Theoretically, the models 
of Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) predict that, for risk averse executives, higher stock 
volatility entail a negative risk-aversion effect which may dominate the wealth effect. 
Confirming the previous prediction, Lewellen (2006) shows that if managers are risk averse 
and not well diversified, in-the-money options discourage executives risk-taking and 
leverage for a wide range of parameters. In other words, if the manager’s risk-aversion is 
large enough and she cannot hedge her exposure to the firm’s stock volatility, the risk-
premium component in [3] encourages executives to reduce firm’s leverage as the options’ 
vega increases. Carlson and Lazrak (2010) show that risk-averse managers more exposed 
to variable pay exhibit lower leverage. 
The models proposed in all these papers provide arguments for why the level of leverage 
across different firms should be negatively related to the ratio of variable pay to the fixed 
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component of the total CEO compensation. However, the empirical literature, reports conflicting 
findings on whether the correlation between pay-for-performance compensation and firm’s 
leverage is positive or negative [Tosun (2015)]. Edmans and Gabaix (2016) discuss that the 
literature lacks a model in which leverage and compensation are jointly determined in a 
framework that allows for risk aversion, effort, risk taking and endogenous costs of borrowing. 
Gete and Gomez (2017) is a first attempt to endogenize effort and leverage decisions in a 
model with exogenous cost of borrowing. The authors analyze the interaction between 
leverage and executive compensation in a model in which the executives’ choice of effort 
is endogenous and affects the likelihood of a crisis. Making CEO’s effort endogenous 
unveils a novel channel for the relation between leverage and compensation. In particular, 
when the CEO is optimistic about asset prices in states of distress, there is a complementarity 
between effort and leverage. Optimism encourages higher leverage, and higher leverage 
entices higher effort to avoid the larger losses if the low state on nature is realized. 
Simultaneously, as the manager is compensated with equity, the manager has more 
incentives to supply effort in a more leveraged firm. 
Dahiya, Gete and Ge (2017) revisit the existing theory and by making effort, leverage and 
credit spreads endogenous, expands it with new insights. The authors describe an economy 
with one firm that is owned by a shareholder who in turn has to hire a CEO to run the firm. The 
model also has a lender from whom the CEO borrows. The CEO is risk-averse while the 
shareholder and the lender are risk-neutral. The firm is exposed to productivity shocks whose 
mean is increasing in CEO’s effort. This effort is costly for the CEO and noncontractable. The 
CEO receives a compensation contract composed of a fixed part and a share of the firm’s 
profits. She decides effort and leverage. The lender prices firm’s leverage with an endogenous 
spread over its costs of funds to be compensated for the risk of default from the firm.
The paper shows that the sign of the cross-sectional correlation between the level of 
leverage and the structure of compensation depends on the interplay of three channels: 
a) More convex compensation encourages effort by exposing the CEO to the rewards from 
higher firms’ profits (increasing the CEO’s pay-for-performance sensitivity); b) Like in Gete 
and Gómez (2017), there is a complementarity between leverage and effort that encourages 
leverage. That is, more convex compensation induces higher effort and since this makes 
bad shocks less likely then leverage increases; c) When the CEO is risk-averse, more 
convex compensation discourages leverage. The basic trade-off faced by the CEO is the 
level of variable compensation to accept and how much to borrow. This arises because 
both of these factors are sources of risk for her. That is, her total compensation has higher 
variance when either pay-for-performance or leverage are larger.
Channels a) and b) above generate a positive cross-sectional correlation between the level 
of leverage and the degree of convexity of executive compensation. Channel c) induces a 
negative correlation. For plausible calibrations the authors find that, except when variable 
compensation or CEO’s risk-aversion are small, channel c) dominates and the correlation 
between the level of leverage and pay-for-performance compensation is negative.
Interestingly, Dahiya, Gete and Ge (2017) predict that the relationship between the change 
in leverage and variable compensation is unambiguously positive after an expansive shift 
in credit supply. This happens because the variable component makes the CEO more 
exposed to firm’s value. Since the credit subsidy generated from the monetary policy shift 
increases the value of the borrowing firm, its CEO will borrow more if she is promised a 
larger share of the firm (i.e. higher variable compensation).
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Moreover, after expansive credit policies, the shareholder offers contracts with less 
variable pay. The shareholder understands that after the stimulus the CEO is supplying 
more effort and choosing higher leverage, which are complements, and sees less need to 
provide variable compensation to motivate the CEO.
Both compensation and firm’s risk are endogenous. Thus, there are reverse causality 
problems. Variable compensation can encourage or discourage leverage for the reasons 
discussed above. However, it may also be the case that shareholders anticipate the risk 
conditions that the firm will face and design CEO’s compensation to optimize their 
performance. Moreover, there may exist other reasons (omitted variables) that 
simultaneously drive compensation and risk-sensitivity. Thus, it is a difficult empirical 
problem to analyze whether compensation drives firm’s risk. We review next how the 
literature has dealt with this problem.
Palia (2001) uses a system of simultaneous equations on panel data to investigate the 
relation between managerial pay-performance sensitivity and firm’s value, controlling for 
the CEO’s age, education and experience. His results show no relation between the firm’s 
Q-value and CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity. 
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) use the change of the Financial Accounting Standards in 
the U.S. in 2005. According to this regulation, options had to be accounted for at their fair 
value and not at their intrinsic value. This regulatory change made options less attractive 
than restricted stock. The authors find that higher vega leads to more leverage, while 
higher delta is associated with lower leverage. Hayes, Lemmon, and Qui (2012) examine 
the relation between option pay and executives’ risk-taking exploiting the same change in 
accounting regulation than Chava and Purnanandam (2010). However, they do not find a 
strong relation between the decline in option pay and less risky investments. 
Shue and Towsend (2017) use a creative instrumental variable to identify causality. They 
use multi-year option plans as instrument because the expected number of granted 
options does not change with firm’s performance. The authors find that a 10% increase in 
new options granted leads to a 2.8-4.2% increase in equity volatility. This increase in risk 
is driven largely by higher leverage. A similar conclusion is obtained by Panousi and 
Papanikolau (2012). They show that the negative effect of idiosyncratic risk on investment 
is stronger when risk-averse executives hold a higher fraction of the firm’s stock.
Dahiya, Gete and Ge (2017) use data on corporate leverage and compensation from 
China’s 2008 credit stimulus. The goal is to study how the structure of compensation alters 
firms’ incentives to borrow. China is unique as its banking sector is almost completely 
state owned. This addresses the problems associated with the transmission of monetary 
and credit policy when risk-averse or poorly capitalized banks refuse to expand credit. 
This “supply” side problem of credit expansion has been the focus of the bank lending 
channel literature [see for example Gambacorta and Shin (2016) or Gambacorta and 
Marques-Ibanez (2011)]. However, this issue is absent in China given the complete control 
of the banking sector by the government. Deng et al. (2015) state this bluntly: “Beijing 
ordered state-owned banks to lend and they lent.”
Following an unexpected deterioration of the economy in the fourth quarter of 2008, China’s 
government suddenly exhorted banks to lend more and at cheaper rates. Total loan quotas, 
which are the lending targets that bank officials should meet, were increased from $4.9 
trillion CNY in 2008 to almost $10 trillion CNY in 2009 [Cong and Ponticelli (2017)]. At the 
4  Compensation 
and Firm’s Leverage. 
Empirical Work
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 32
same time, the Central Bank dramatically lowered banks’ reserve requirements and 
expanded money supply. The annualized growth rate of real M2 went up from 14.9% in 
2008Q4 to 26.2% in 2009Q1, and to 33.9% in 2009Q2. Ouyang and Peng (2015) state 
that “this was the biggest stimulus program in the world, equal to about the three times 
size of the U.S. effort.” The literature agrees that nobody anticipated this large credit 
stimulus [Naughton (2009) and Deng et al. (2015)].
Dahiya, Gete and Ge (2017) show that the level of leverage and CEO’s variable share of 
compensation are negatively correlated in the cross-section of Chinese firms. This 
suggests that CEO’s risk-aversion is a dominant factor. Second, right after the 2008 credit 
push, the firms with a higher share of variable compensation increase their leverage faster. 
Thus, the structure of the executive compensation has a significant influence on which 
firms reacted more to the credit stimulus. The results are robust across different 
specifications and controlling for the main alternative drivers of compensation and 
leverage. They are particularly strong for firms in the real-estate sector. This suggests an 
interesting interaction between increases in leverage induced by convex compensation, 
and those caused by higher collateral values [Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012), or 
Cvijanović (2014)].
From what we have reviewed above, there is theoretical and empirical support for the 
structure of compensation driving leverage dynamics. Following the 2008 financial crisis, 
there has been a lively debate in the academic and policy circles about regulating executive 
compensation to avoid excessive firms’ leverage. In this section we survey some work on 
the optimal regulation.
John et al. (2000), Bebchuk and Spamann (2009), Bolton et al. (2011), Raviv and Sisli-Ciamarra 
(2013), Hakenes and Schnabel (2014), or Thanassoulis (2014) propose arguments for 
regulation based on risk-shifting problems and externalities from competition in labor markets. 
Gete and Gómez (2015) analyzes the impact of remuneration practices on banks’ risk-taking, 
captured by the level of short-term leverage, in a model with fire sales externalities but 
exogenous effort and exogenous compensation contracts. Fire sales externalities are at the 
center of the new macroprudential approach to regulation [Kashyap et al. (2011)]. Fire sales 
occur when financially distressed firms need to sell assets at prices below their value in a 
best-use scenario. Fire sales can be quite sizeable and lead to high discounts relative to face 
value. For instance, in March 2012, Spain’s Banco Santander sold property-backed loans for 
EUR 750 million at a 62 percent discount to face value. In June of the same year, the UK’s 
Lloyds sold property-backed loans for EUR 971 million after a discount of 52 percent.
Gete and Gómez (2015) show that when fire sales externalities are not internalized by a 
bank’s shareholders and executives, borrowing is higher than the socially optimal level. 
Regulating executive compensation can achieve socially superior outcomes because it 
alters the incentives of bank executives. They analyze four compensation structures 
proposed by the academic literature: 
1 First, plain-vanilla equity fails to internalize fire sales externalities, as it does 
not “penalize” short-term relative to long-term payoffs. 
2) and 3) Deferred equity and long-term bonuses unrelated to short-term profits 
can restore the efficiency loss induced by the fire sales externality. Long-term 
bonuses unrelated to short-term profits increase the opportunity cost of fire 
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sales, thus, reducing fire sales. Deferred compensation works if agents value 
one dollar less in the future than in the present. If that is the case, then 
deferred compensation reduces the rewards from short-term debt. Thus, it 
lowers the incentives to leverage and sell at a discount in the case of a liquidity 
shock. Deferred compensation would be useless if it is invested in an interest-
making account paying the same interest rate as the bank executives’ 
discount rate. In fact, deferred compensation can be thought of as a tax on 
compensation, where the tax rate is the executives’ discount rate. 
4) Bail-in bonds reduce incentives to short-term debt by paying equity in cases 
of bank distress, in which equity has no value. The advantage of bail-in bonds 
is that they are a “cheaper” way to provide incentives. They increase the 
opportunity cost of fire sales in periods with liquidity needs while avoiding any 
remuneration for executives in periods with no liquidity problems.
Compensation schemes in real life are actually more complex than in this model. They may 
include severance packages (which may increase the compensation’s vega), trading 
restrictions (to limit the manager’s ability to game the compensation incentives), or vesting 
periods for stock options. These mechanisms may help to curb CEO’s risk appetite. Our 
numerical exercises, however, show that regulating the level of compensation can have 
unintended consequences. Setting upper or lower bounds on the number of shares, 
deferred shares and/or the size of long-term bonuses may lead bank executives to an 
overcautious choice of debt and, ultimately, fire sales below the socially optimal level. 
Based on these insights, Gete and Gómez (2017) show that, when the CEO’s choices of 
leverage and effort are endogenous, letting shareholders vote on the design of compensation 
schemes (like say-on-pay schemes) fails to prevent socially inefficient firms’ overleverage. 
Regulating the ratio of variable-to-fixed payments (but not the level of compensation) can 
deliver socially optimal leverage levels. 
Gete and Gómez (2017) conclude that, at least for risk-neutral agents, the optimal regulation 
is not the regulation of executive compensation. A cap on debt is socially more efficient: it 
can restore the efficient level of debt with a lower distortion in managerial effort. Whether 
this result holds after introducing managerial risk aversion remains open for future research. 
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EUROPEAN BANKS US DOLLAR LIABILITIES: BEYOND THE COVERED 
INTEREST PARITY
This article provides an update of the determinants of dollar-denominated long-term debt 
issuance by euro area banks, with a particular focus on deviations from Covered Interest 
Parity (CIP).These deviations, which have become more common since the global financial 
crisis, may have contributed to the so-called “covered cost savings” for banks issuing in 
US dollars at different moments in time. In contrast, negative savings may have deterred 
issuance in this currency during other periods. Since 2015, the relationship between 
covered cost savings and US dollar issuance seems to have weakened although 
“opportunistic” issuance may have persisted. We also document that recent regulatory 
reforms have enhanced the issuance of subordinated and other specific forms of long-
term debt by euro area banks. These banks may have been incentivized to issue these 
bonds in US dollar, given the traditionally deep and wide US dollar investor base (i.e. 
strategic issuance). In addition to this, we investigate the possible reasons for CIP 
deviations as measured by the cross-currency basis swap. We conclude by analyzing 
possible financial stability consequences of the reliance of banks on US dollar markets 
and discuss how the supply of US dollars by non-banking entities, particularly those 
located in emerging economies, can create risks to the global financial system.
Banks can choose between various currencies to fund their operations. The specific 
choice of the funding currency has not been investigated thoroughly for banks in the 
literature. This is somewhat surprising as some banks increasingly have been issuing in 
foreign currency. This article will investigate this issue in detail. More specifically, we shall 
focus on US dollar issuance by euro area banks. 
The absolute amount of US dollar-denominated bonds issued by banks headquartered in 
the euro area totaled more than $60 billion in 2016, the fourth-largest yearly amount after 
2007 and the second highest ever when only fixed-coupon bonds are considered. 














































 % USD OVER TOTAL (right hand scale)
%nlb DSU
A  USD BOND ISSUANCE BY EURO AREA BANKS








2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
 TOTAL UK  TOTAL JAPAN
USD bln
B  USD BOND ISSUANCE  BYJAPANESE AND BRITISH BANKS
 GERMANY
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 56 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 32
euro area banks was around 19% in 2016, the highest relative amount on record. US dollar 
issuance by these banks was very strong during the first months of 2017 as well, both in 
absolute and in relative terms ($23 billion and 22%, respectively) (Chart 1, panel A). Recent 
large US dollar debt bank issuance is framed within the general trend towards heavier US 
dollar debt supply by euro area banks since the historical lows recorded during the global 
financial crisis (2%). Moreover, this tendency has held relatively steady in spite of high 
quarterly volatility and the negative impact of some periods of market distress. For 
instance, US dollar debt supply by euro area banks fell significantly during the euro area 
financial crisis in 2011-2012, during the rising geopolitical tensions at the end of 2014 and 
in parallel to the turbulences in the European Contingent Convertible Capital (CoCos) bond 
market at the beginning of 2016. An upsurge in US dollar borrowing usually followed these 
downturns, signaling the interest of euro area banks to further increase the importance of 
the US dollar in their long-term market funding operations. 
By country, Germany was the largest issuer of US dollar-denominated bonds before the 
global financial crisis. However, the dominance of this country declined in line with total 
bond issuance activity of German banks after the abolishment of government guarantees 
for their regional banks (Landesbanken) in 2005 and the bankruptcies of some German 
banks in 2007-2009 [Van Rixtel et al. (2016) and Romo González (2016)]. After the crisis, 
the largest issuers were France and the Netherlands, being the latter the most important 
US dollar bond issuer in 2016. On the other hand, the share of Spanish and Italian banks 
within the euro area increased slightly after the crisis, but was in 2016 still below the pre-
crisis levels.
Outside the euro area, US dollar long-term debt issuance by Japanese banks also has 
been very high in recent years. Japanese banks issued a historical record amount of 
almost $37 billion in 2016 (55% of their total bond issuance) (Chart 1, panel B). British 
banks, which were traditionally heavy issuers of US dollar debt in the past, have also 
increased their share of US dollar bond funding in recent years: more than 60% of total 
bonds issued by British banks in 2016 was denominated in US dollars, the highest 
proportion ever for these issuers. 
What motivates a non-US bank to issue in US dollars? The US dollar is the dominant 
international currency, which explains the preference for US dollar debt borrowing and 
its’ dominance in foreign exchange reserve holdings. For instance, the share of the US 
dollar in outstanding international debt securities and in the official holdings of foreign 
exchange reserves was around 60% and 64% in 2015, respectively [ECB (2016); see 
also Avdjiev et al. (2016)]. According to Shin (2016), the global banking system “runs in 
dollars”, given the preeminent role of the US dollar in international transactions. However, the 
importance of the US dollar as the main anchor or international funding currency explains 
the level but not necessarily the developments in US dollar-denominated bond issuance by 
euro area banks in the last decade. In order to understand the latter, the specific literature on 
the determinants of foreign-currency denominated debt is more useful. The studies on the 
topic broadly point to three reasons for issuing foreign-currency debt: 1) on-balance sheet 
hedging of foreign currency exposures; 2) opportunistic issuance in order to realize lower 
issuance costs and 3) strategic drivers, linked to the characteristics of the investor base. 
The most frequently mentioned motivation for the issuance of debt denominated in a foreign 
currency is that it serves as a natural hedge to assets that are denominated in a similar 
foreign currency i.e. to perform on-balance sheet hedging. Literature on the topic has 
mostly focused on non-financial firms, for which there is ample empirical evidence of 
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on-balance sheet hedging (e.g. Keloharju and Niskanen, 2001 and Allayannis et al., 2003). 
As for financial institutions, it can be considered that banks completely hedge their positions 
[e.g. McGuire and Von Peter (2009a and 2009b); Fender and McGuire (2010) and Ivashina et al. 
(2015)] and that they have regulatory incentives to do so. For example, Ivashina et al. (2015) 
argue that if banks were to leave currency risks unhedged, they would face an additional 
regulatory capital charge. However, banks do not necessarily need to fully match on-
balance the currency denomination of their assets and liabilities. When assets denominated 
in a specific currency are larger than liabilities in the same currency for a bank, such as in the 
case of Japanese banks and some euro area banks (see sections 4 and 5), it is assumed that 
they use off-balance sheet instruments to hedge their currency risk [e.g. McGuire and Von 
Peter (2009a and 2009b) and Eklund et al. (2012)].
Other studies suggest that firms issue foreign currency debt opportunistically to take 
advantage of Covered Interest Parity (CIP) and Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) deviations 
in international markets. These deviations can create so-called “covered” or “uncovered” 
cost savings or “bargains” when issuing debt [McBrady and Schill (2007) and Habib and 
Joy (2010)]. When firms issue on an unhedged basis, they borrow in the currency with the 
lower interest rate and do not buy any protection against the appreciation of that currency, 
in spite of UIP theory predicting exactly that outcome. It constitutes a sort of carry trade 
[Liao (2016)]. We assume that banks are more receptive to reap the benefits from covered 
cost savings than uncovered cost savings, given their better knowledge of and access to 
derivatives markets. Moreover, it is unlikely that banks leave open currency positions or 
expositions to currency fluctuations, given high regulatory costs, as explained above. 
Hence, they will probably hedge any US dollar funding operation rather than leaving it 
unhedged. In fact, some anecdotal evidence points to positive covered cost savings as the 
main drivers of US dollar debt issuance by banks [e.g. Moody’s (2011) and JP Morgan (2015)]. 
However, other studies yield different results, based on banks adopting a counterparty 
position in currency swaps [McBrady and Schill (2004) and Habib and Joy (2010)]. More 
recently, Liao (2016) points to large public firms from developed countries issuing 
opportunistically more frequently on a hedged than on an unhedged basis. 
Finally, companies may strategically issue in a foreign currency to gain access to deeper, 
more liquid or more complete markets or to a wider investor base [Keloharju and Niskanen 
(2001)]. Given that transaction costs in more liquid markets are lower (as long as these 
costs are a decreasing function of volumes), firms would prefer to issue foreign currency 
denominated debt in related liquid markets over more illiquid options [Munro and 
Wooldridge (2009) and Hale et al. (2014)]. For instance, Hale and Spiegel (2009) consider 
that foreign “vehicle currencies” such as the US dollar are useful to reduce administrative 
costs, given their economies of scale. Interestingly, the issuance of debt for strategic 
reasons may constitute a long-term funding strategy for banks which may lead them to 
deviate from pure opportunistic issuance in some cases, given the importance of 
maintaining their presence in a certain market [e.g. as described for US dollar-denominated 
covered bonds in ECBC (2016)].
 In Romo González (2016), we provided an econometric analysis of the main drivers of US 
dollar-denominated debt issuance for a sample of banks located in the euro area, 
Switzerland and the UK between 2005 and the beginning of 2013. We find evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that banks issued US dollar-denominated debt for opportunistic 
reasons. More specifically, we show that European banks took advantage of CIP deviations 
and find support for the on-balance sheet hedging hypothesis and, to a certain extent, for 
strategic motivations. Moreover, we also show that high financial distress in markets 
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reduced the access to US dollar markets of European banks and that banks perceived as 
stronger (e.g. higher-rated) had better access to US dollar markets than weaker banks. In 
this article we will summarize some of the findings in Romo González (2016) and we add a 
descriptive update of the newest developments in US dollar-denominated long-term debt 
issuance by euro area banks and of covered cost savings. Hence, the structure of this 
article is as follows. Section 2 gives a theoretical explanation of the short-run and long-run 
CIP and the connection of CIP with the concept of covered cost savings. Section 3 explains 
the developments of covered cost savings for euro area banks with a particular focus on the 
developments between 2013 and 2016, when US dollar-denominated bond issuance by 
euro area banks increased to new record highs. We find some evidence that this trend 
overall has been less driven by opportunistic motivations, particularly since 2015 and 
more driven by strategic and regulatory factors. This notwithstanding, opportunistic 
motivations could explain to a certain extent the preference for US dollar denomination of 
some bonds issued by euro area banks. Section 4 analyzes the motivations for CIP 
deviations provided by the literature on the topic, with a particular focus on the most 
recent studies. Section 5 reflects on the consequences to financial stability related to 
banks’ cross-border activities and US dollar funding as well as the possible new risks 
created by non-bank providers of US dollars in the FX swap market for the financial 
system. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
A non-US bank may issue US dollar denominated debt “opportunistically” whenever US 
dollar borrowing is less costly on a hedged basis than borrowing in the domestic 
currency. The CIP is a no- arbitrage condition or condition of indifference such that when 
it holds, both funding options are cost-equivalent and the bank would be indifferent 
between one and the other. More specifically, at short maturities, CIP defines “the relationship 
among the spot exchange rate, the interest rate in two countries, and the forward rate... 
(which) implies that a borrower who hedges in the forward exchange market realizes the 
same domestic borrowing rate whether borrowing domestically or in a foreign country” 
[Fabozzi and Modigliani (2008), p. 659]. Short-term CIP in simple terms is defined as 
[see Popper (1993)]: 
(1 + r € t,t + n ) F t,t + n /S t = ( 1+r 
$ t,t + n )                                           (1)
where r € t,t + n and r 
$ t,t + n are the domestic currency respectively foreign-currency risk-free 
rates for the period between t and t+n, S t is the spot exchange rate at t (US dollar per unit 
of euro) and F t,t + n is the outright FX forward rate at t expiring at t+n. The left-hand side of the 
equation would represent the FX swap implied US dollar rate from the euro [Baba and Packer 
(2009)].1 If CIP does not hold, we should add a non-zero basis (x) to Formula (1) such that: 
 (1 + r € t,t + n  + x) F t,t + n /S t = ( 1+r 
$ t,t + n )                                        (2)
If we apply logs to (2) and rearrange the terms, we have the following expression of short-
term CIP: 
x = r $ t,t + n – ( r 
€ t,t + n + ƒ – s )                                                 (3)
1  The CIP condition can be also explained using an FX outright forward contract, which is defined as an agreement to 
exchange two currencies at a future date at an agreed upon exchange rate [Foreign Exchange Committee (2010)]. A 
FX swap is defined as a contract in which a party borrows one currency from, and simultaneously lends another to 
the counterparty, being the amount of repayment fixed at the FX forward rate [see Baba et al. (2008)]. 
2  An introduction 
to CIP and covered 
cost savings
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 59 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 32
Where ƒ and s are the log equivalents of F t,t + n and S t, respectively.
2 If x is negative, direct 
borrowing in euros in the cash market is more expensive than borrowing in US dollars and 
converting the proceeds to euros through a FX swap (i.e. direct euro borrowing is more 
expensive than “synthetic euro borrowing”). 
FX swaps are liquid only for terms below 1 or 2 years [Baba et al. (2008) and Popper (1993)]. 
Hence, at longer maturities, investors and borrowers may rather use currency swaps to 
hedge currency risk.3 A currency swap is an agreement, usually ranging between 1 and 30 
years, in which two parties agree to exchange a series of interest payments in different 
currencies (in contrast to FX swaps, where there are no periodical interim payments). 
These payments can be fixed or referenced to a floating rate and, in contrast to interest 
rate swaps (IRS),4 notional principals can be exchanged at the beginning of the contract 
based on the initial spot exchange rate, S t, and exchanged back at the maturity date at the 
same spot exchange rate S t.
5 There are several kind of currency swaps, but in what follows 
we will focus on the so called cross-currency basis swaps (CCBS), in which floating 
interest rates in different currencies (e.g. 3-month Euribor and US dollar LIBOR) are 
exchanged periodically, as in Figure 1. In this case, following market convention the basis 
or spread  is added to the domestic currency floating reference.6 Interestingly, a negative 
 would be detrimental for counterparty demanding US dollars in the CCBS (it receives 
3-month Euribor “minus” ). Likewise, the counterparty providing US dollars in the CCBS 
benefits from a negative, given that its’ periodic payments will be lower than the 3-month 
2  We assume that Ln (1 + r) = ˜  r. 
3  Market players can, alternatively, roll-over short-term FX swaps to cover a currency risk for the long-term. The roll-over 
strategy can be profitable for some investors, such as Japanese pension and insurance investors [BofAML (2017)]. 
4  In a plain vanilla interest rate swap (IRS), two counterparties exchange a stream of interest payments, one fixed and 
other floating, in a common currency. The interest rate payments are based on a notional principal but the parties do 
not exchange the notional principal. 
5  This is the description of a non-mark to-market CCBS. In a mark-to-market CCBS, principals are reset periodically 
[Credit Suisse (2013)].
6  The CCBS basis α is different to the basis x in Formulas 2 and 3. As explained below, whereas x measures deviations 
from CIP in the short-run, CCBS basis α measures deviations from CIP in the long-run. 
FIGURE 1
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Euribor. Hence, every time the basis  is negative, a potential profitable arbitrage strategy 
consists on lending US dollars in the CCBS until the basis is near or equal to zero. 
For the reasons mentioned above, the long-run CIP condition requires currency swaps, in 
what Popper (1993) calls the “swap-covered interest parity condition”. Given that the 
focus of our study is long-term bond issuance by banks, the long-run version of CIP based 
on currency swap rates is more useful for our study than the short-run CIP version [see 
also Habib and Joy (2010) and McBrady and Schill (2007)]: 
 r € t,t + k  –  c 
€ t,t + k  = r 
$ t,t + k   – c 
$ t,t + k                                              (4)
where r € t,t + k  and r 
$ t,t + k are the domestic currency and foreign-currency rates between t and 
t+k, respectively; c € t,t + k is the domestic (fixed) currency swap yield at maturity k and c 
$ t,t + k 
is the foreign currency (fixed) currency swap yield at maturity k. As explained in Romo 
González (2016), c € t,t + k is a combination of the domestic currency IRS fixed rate (Z€ ) and 
the CCBS basis , and c $ t,t + k is equivalent to the US dollar IRS fixed rate (Z$ ) (See Figure 2 
horizontal arrows). Equation (4) implies the following: if long-run CIP holds, a bank which 
covers its position through currency swaps should be indifferent between borrowing in the 
domestic currency (e.g. the euro) or in the foreign currency on a hedged basis (e.g. the US 
dollar). If CIP does not hold, a bank would have an opportunity to make riskless profits 
through arbitrage until the cost of borrowing in domestic currency equals the cost of 
hedged borrowing in US dollars. For example, if a euro area bank observes the following 
in the market: 
r € t,t + k  –  c 
€ t,t + k  > r 
$ t,t + k   – c 
$ t,t + k     or     r 
€ t,t + k >  r 
$ t,t + k – c 
$ t,t + k + c 
€ t,t + k                (5)
It would be more expensive to issue a euro denominated-long term bond (pay r € t,t + k ) than 
issuing a “synthetic euro denominated bond” (paying r $ t,t + k   – c 
$ t,t + k + c 
€ t,t + k , see Figure 2), 
that is, than issuing an US dollar-denominated long-term bond on a hedged basis. Notice that 
this is called a synthetic euro denominated bond, because the US dollar lender is replicating 
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c € t,t + k = Z€ + 
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In equation (3) we gave the general definition for the short-run CIP basis (x) based on risk-
free rates (as if borrowers could borrow at risk-free rates). CCBS basis stands for the 
long-run CIP basis when the interest rates are IRS rates.7 However, banks usually pay 
a premium over IRS rates when borrowing in the long-term debt markets (i.e. they pay a 
positive “swap spread”). Hence, we define a specific long-term basis for euro area banks 
such that: 
B = r $ t,t + k – c 
$ t,t + k + c 
€ t,t + k – r 
€ t,t + k                                                             (6)
                                                                   c € t,t + k = Z€ + 
c $ t,t + k = Z$
When B is negative (or when the basis “widens” or there are CIP deviations, in what 
follows), we would be back to the situation described by Formula (5) in which it is more 
expensive to issue a euro- denominated bond than to issue a US dollar-denominated bond 
on a hedged basis (i.e. create a “synthetic euro denominated bond”). Hence, we expect 
that when B is below zero, euro area banks are more inclined to issue US dollar-
denominated long-term debt and swap the proceeds to euro through a combination of IRS 
and CCBS (or directly through a fixed-for-fixed currency swap). When B is positive, on the 
contrary, there should be more bonds issued in euros in relative terms. When B is close to 
zero, we say that there are no CIP deviations for euro area banks. Notice in Formula (6) and 
Figure (2) that when the CCBS basis  is negative, the lender of US dollars in the CCBS 
has a benefit over the borrower of US dollars because it will pay less than the euro IRS. A 
euro area bank issuing in US dollars to lend them in the CCBS may obtain a profit. 
Moreover, a more negative basis  makes the basis B even more negative. 
In Romo González (2016) we defined “covered” (borrowing) cost savings [following e.g. Habib 
and Joy (2010)]. Covered cost savings are just the negative of B and measure the borrowing 
costs savings that any euro area bank could make by issuing a US dollar-denominated 
bond and swapping the proceeds into euros, instead of issuing directly in euros. Hence, a 
negative B is equivalent to positive covered cost savings and when the basis is close to 
zero, covered cost savings of issuing in US dollars on a hedged basis are close to zero as 
well. If covered cost savings are zero, we assume that there are no CIP deviations: 
C = (r € t,t + k – c € t,t + k ) – ( r $ t,t + k   – c $ t,t + k )                                                (7)
Where again:
                                c € t,t + k = Z€ + 
                                c $ t,t + k = Z$
In what follows, we will focus on the covered cost savings for euro area banks instead of 
on the basis. We expect a positive relationship between covered cost savings and the ratio 
of US dollar debt issued by banks over total issuance.8 In order to calculate covered cost 
savings for euro area banks, we use the yields of several investment grade indices from 
Markit and Bank of America Merril Lynch (BofAML). These indices provide a measure for 
the costs for financial companies and banks in euros and US dollars. Ideally, a yield 
7  See Du et al. (2016) for further detail. 
8  We obtain a similar picture when comparing US dollar total issuance over total issuance of bonds denominated in 
euros controlling for the spot exchange rate variations over time. 
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comparison should be drawn on a bond by bond basis, comparing US dollar and euro-
denominated bonds of similar rating and maturity issued by the same bank. Hence, the 
indices used here are mere approximations,9 although similar methods are used in some 
investment banks’ reports and studies [e.g. BofAML (2017) for calculations on investors’ 
demand for US dollar assets and Liao (2016).10 We will use 10 year CCBS and IRS swaps 
to match the average maturity of US dollar fixed-coupon bonds since 2005.11
Chart 2, panel A, shows general covered cost savings for euro area banks for “synthetic 
euro bonds” vis-à-vis direct issuance in euros12 as well as the relative amount of US dollar-
denominated bond issuance by euro area banks over total issuance in all currencies. As 
expected, the Chart shows a positive correlation between both variables during most of 
the period considered. Covered cost savings were negative but relatively close to zero 
between 2005 and 2007, when markets were still enjoying relative good funding conditions 
and arbitrage by market players was effectively keeping the basis near zero.13 However, 
since 2007 the level and the development of covered cost savings have varied substantially. 
We can classify covered cost savings for euro area banks into three different periods since 
the global financial crisis, depending on the general behavior of the variable. 
The first period covers approximately the global financial crisis, which was essentially a 
US centered crisis or a US dollar crisis. It was characterized by very negative covered 
cost savings, which sunk to historical record lows at the beginning of 2009 (some time 
after the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008) and remained very negative until the 
end of 2010. Negative covered cost savings were mainly driven by the large spread 
differentials between the US dollar and the euro. This can roughly be approximated by the 
spreads between the yields and the IRS rates for each currency. According to this measure, 
long-term funding in US dollars relative to euros became very expensive (see Chart 4, 
panel A). Even when the CCBS basis  was negative, signaling profitable opportunities for 
CIP arbitrage (see Formula 7), high funding costs for euro area banks at that time might 
have made the arbitrage through US dollar bond issuance unprofitable for them. In 
consequence, relative total US dollar debt issuance by euro area banks was only around 
2% on average by mid-2009. 
9   For example, the BofAML and Markit indices are based on bonds issued by entities from different nationalities e.g. 
the investment grade US dollar BofAML banking index include US dollar bonds issued by non-euro area banks; 
similarly, the euro banking BofAML index includes euro bonds issued by non-euro area banks. Thus, these indices 
may not be fully representative of the real interest rates faced by euro area banks or financial companies during our 
sample period. Second, the bonds included in these indices do not necessarily have a ten year maturity, as is the 
case of the currency and interest rate swaps used for the approximation. Moreover, even though all bonds included 
are investment grade, differences in costs may arise between banks rated near the AAA or AA marks and banks 
closer to the below investment-grade threshold. The former is solved by using the different maturity and rating 
structures of Markit, although in this case, we take into account funding costs of all financial companies and not only 
banks (see Chart 3 panel B). 
10  Du et al. (2016) provide a detailed explanation on their method for calculating long-term CIP deviations for KfW, an 
agency fully backed by the German government considered to be risk-free. They use zero-coupon yield curves and 
swap rates as proxy for CIP measures. In one of their appendices they explain how to exactly calculate the basis for 
coupon bearing bonds. 
11  Generally similar results, with only some exceptions, are obtained when 5-year swaps are used for the period be-
tween 2005 and 2013. This would roughly match the median maturity of US dollar bonds issued by euro area banks. 
12  Here we used the banking BofAML indices to track the performance of euro and US dollar investment-grade debt, 
respectively, publicly issued by banks. To qualify for these indices, the bond must have at least 18 months to final 
maturity when issued (which matches the maturity of our sample) as well as a fixed-coupon schedule and a certain 
minimum amount outstanding. The US dollar banking BofAML index includes investment-grade US dollar-denomi-
nated bonds issued in the US market by US and non-US banks. As with all approximations, using alternative indices 
or alternative calculation methods provide some changes in the levels of Covered Cost Savings, but overall trends 
are similar. Bond issuance includes fixed-coupon instruments only.
13  For the calculations of the basis we are not taking into account transaction costs in derivative markets as in Du et 
al. (2016) or Pinnington and Shamloo (2016).
3  Covered cost savings 
and US dollar issuance
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In contrast, covered cost savings turned positive during the euro area financial crisis, 
which started in May 2010 with the announcement of the first bail-out package to Greece. 
Covered cost savings reached a historical high at the beginning of 2011. In parallel, US 
dollar total debt issuance recovered from its 2009 lows and accounted for a 12% of total 
issuance by euro area banks on average in mid-2011. US dollar total debt activity fell 
afterwards, affected by the spillover of sovereign tensions to the banking sector and the 
increase of currency redenomination risk. As during the global financial crisis, credit 
spread differentials were significant drivers of the covered cost savings of banks. Given 
that the focus of the financial crisis was located on Europe, euro-denominated long-term 
funding costs for banks increased significantly and were at times even higher than costs 
of funding in US dollars. Volatility was very high during this period as banks tapped markets 
whenever a window of opportunity opened, coinciding with the brief periods of lower risk 
aversion in international markets.
Covered cost savings were positive until around mid-2015 when US dollar debt issuance 
accounted for around 18% of total debt issuance on average by euro area banks. However, 
the positive correlation between these savings and US dollar funding seems to have weakened 
since then: covered cost savings started to decrease due to higher US dollar funding costs, 
in parallel to the end of the quantitative easing policies by the Fed by the end of 2014 and the 
enactment of very accommodative policies by the ECB. Interestingly, US dollar bond issuance 
activity continued trending higher and reached a new historical record high in the third quarter 
of 2016 in relative terms (29%). The obvious question is what drove this huge growth of US 
dollar denominated debt issuance by euro area banks in recent years. To answer this, we 
need to take a look at the composition of the US dollar debt issued by banks, in which the 
share of subordinated debt has increased substantially (Chart 2, panel B). 
One of the biggest drivers of the upsurge in US dollar funding by euro area banks between 
2013 and 2016 was the issuance of subordinated long-term debt. Subordinated14 US dollar 
denominated-bond issuance has rapidly increased since 2010, from around $1 bln to almost 
14  We consider here fixed-coupon subordinated bonds only.
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$22 bln in 2015 (Chart 2, panel B). Although it decreased in 2016, total issuance was still 
more than $16 bln that year, well above the historical average. In relative terms, the share of 
US dollar subordinated bonds represented around 30% of total US dollar bond issuance in 
2016, which compares to only 3% in 2010 (Chart 3, panel A). The trend towards higher 
issuance of subordinated bonds by euro area banks has not been exclusively limited to US 
dollar long-term debt: banks needed to issue subordinated debt in order to meet the new 
capital requirements stipulated by Basel III and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) 
in the EU. Moreover, subordinated debt is required to build the new TLAC and MREL buffer 
requirements, which have already entered into force, or will do so very soon.15 That said, 
subordinated debt accounted only for 11% of total euro denominated-bond issuance in 
2016. Even if euro denominated covered bonds are excluded (which account for 43% of the 
total euro bank bond universe), subordinated debt still has a lower weight in total euro 
denominated bond issuance than its US dollar equivalent. In consequence, there seems to 
have been a bias towards subordinated long-term issuance in US dollars by euro area banks. 
Why did euro area banks start to issue this large amount of US dollar-denominated 
subordinated bonds? A couple of possible drivers come to mind. First, as mentioned before, 
euro area banks needed to meet the new capital and bail-in regulatory requirements. Second, 
strategic motivations related to issuance in the US dollar could have played a very important 
role. According to several market reports, euro area banks have been taking advantage of the 
traditionally deep and wider US dollar investor base, particularly during times of market 
uncertainty [see for example Fitch Ratings (2016)].16 Moreover, US dollar investors have 
been more receptive to European banks’ new regulatory bonds than other investors, due to 
the perception of improving credit fundamentals of European banks, although some concerns 
for profitability and bad loans still exist [Goldman Sachs (2017)]. Finally, pricing considerations 
could have been important as well. Many of the US dollar denominated-subordinated bonds 
issued by euro area banks since 2012 have been issued at maturities of 10 years or longer. 
Moreover, most have been rated in the BBB bucket. Chart 3, panel B, shows covered cost 
savings for bonds issued by financial companies as reported by Markit. Covered cost savings 
are currently positive for BBB bonds in the 7 to 10 year maturity bucket. Hence, even though 
the positive correlation between covered cost savings and total US dollar debt issuance has 
been not so clear since mid-2015 (recall Chart 2, panel A), a further breakdown of these 
savings by rating and maturity shows that opportunistic funding of subordinated debt 
probably continued to be a important driver of US dollar long-term debt issuance. 
Finally, strong issuance of US dollar-denominated subordinated bonds by euro area banks 
decelerated in 2016 and in the first quarter of 2017. This was most likely due to the sell-off 
in the CoCo market at the beginning of 2016 and political uncertainties in Europe, such as 
the UK referendum in June to leave the EU and the elections in several European countries 
in the first half of 2017 [for more details, see Fuertes et al. (2017) and LBBW (2017)]. In 
general, issuance of subordinated bonds is traditionally more affected by market turmoil 
and financial distress than other kinds of debt perceived by investors to be safer, such as 
covered bonds, regardless of opportunistic pricing considerations. This can be seen in the 
low overall issuance of subordinated bonds in the period between 2009 and 2012. 
15  The Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued the final Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) standard for global sys-
temically important banks (G-SIBs) in November 2015. European GSIBs will be required to meet TLAC since Janu-
ary 2019. In addition to this, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) requires adequate “bail-in” capital 
for all banks in the EU since January 2016 (the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities or MREL). 
The goal of both requirements is very similar (that banks have enough loss-absorbing capacity in case of resolution) 
although there are differences with respect to some of their features. 
16  Europeans banks have also issued large quantities of US dollar-denominated “Formosa” bonds since 2014 i.e. 
bonds sold in Taiwan. Strategic motivations seem to have driven this trend as well. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 65 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 32
Interestingly, another positive factor driving US dollar bond issuance by euro area banks in 
2016 may have been the replacement of US Money Market Funds (US MMFs) funding with 
more long-term US dollar denominated debt (see section 5).17 Moreover, since the beginning 
of 2017, issuance of senior non-preferred bonds by euro area banks has picked up, which 
are also needed to comply with TLAC/MREL buffer requirements.18 As with subordinated 
debt, the tapping of the liquid and diversified US dollar investor pool has been an important 
motivation to increase issuance of these bonds denominated in US dollars. 
As discussed before, changes in the cross-currency basis swap (CCBS basis ) are a 
driver of covered cost savings of euro area banks or of the “bank basis” B (see components 
in Formulas (6) and (7) and Chart 4, panel A). More specifically, a negative basis  in the 
currency swap markets for some currencies such as the euro and the yen against the US 
dollar enlarge the cost savings that euro area (Japanese) banks can realize by issuing in 
US dollars on a hedged basis (by issuing “synthetic euro bonds”). Therefore, in this section 
we will focus on the developments in global financial markets that drove deviations in CIP 
as measured by the CCBS basis. As we shall discuss, several studies suggest that the 
factors driving these deviations since mid-2014 are different to those driving the basis 
during the crises periods of 2007-2008 and 2010-2012. In general, both policy and academic 
studies have concentrated on deviations from CIP, particularly since 2007, as measured by 
the CCBS basis and the shorter-term FX swap basis (basis  and x in section 2). In relation 
to this, the CCBS basis regained importance in the breakdown of covered cost savings 
since the end of 2014 (Chart 4, panel A). 
17  US dollar short-term lending by US MMFs was negatively affected by the US MMF reform effective in October 2016. 
This reform affected mostly the so called institutional prime MMFs, which were heavy investors on short-term debt 
securities issued by US and non-US banks. This reform, which had the goal to avoid market disruptions as seen 
during the global financial crisis, implied the adoption of floating net asset value for institutional prime MMFs, among 
other measures. This reduced the attractiveness of prime funds vis-à-vis other MMFs such as institutional govern-
ment MMFs, not affected by these reforms. As a result, prime MMFs in the US substantially reduced their holdings 
of short-term debt securities issued by banks.
18  The EU is currently working on harmonizing the different approaches inside the EU on bank creditors’ insolvency 
ranking. The European Comission announced in November 2016 its’ support for the “contractual subordination” 
option or the “un-preferred tier senior debt” as a way to harmonize the building of TLAC buffers inside the EU 
[European Commission (2016) and LBBW (2017)]. 
4  Developments 
in the cross-currency 
basis swap markets 
and covered cost 
savings
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Chart 4, panel B, shows the development of the CCBS basis from 2005 up to 2017 for the 
euro and the yen against the US dollar for 5- and 10-year maturities. In the pre-crisis 
period, the basis was very small and close to zero, which implies that profitable deviations 
in the CIP were transitory [Akram et al. (2008)]. Large CIP deviations between 2008 and 
2012 (i.e. widening of the basis or a more negative basis) were linked to episodes of US 
dollar funding and liquidity distress, large dollar shortages, heightened transaction costs 
and the deterioration of the creditworthiness of non-US banks in need of US dollars. For 
instance, during the global financial crisis and the euro area financial crisis, deviations of 
CIP were the result of the heavy borrowing of US dollars in FX swap markets by (mostly) 
non-US banks to compensate for the loss of access to the US dollar interbank market and 
US MMFs [see Nakaso (2017); BIS (2016) and Pinnington and Shamloo (2016)]. The 
introduction of central bank US dollar swap lines and the adoption of measures to reduce 
liquidity and credit risk possibly were effective in narrowing the basis at that time [Baba 
and Packer (2009)]. However, in spite of no apparent funding or liquidity distress, the basis 
started to widen again in mid-2014 and has stayed persistently away from zero ever since 
then. Moreover, CIP deviations persist even after controlling for credit risk and transaction 
costs, which point to real arbitrage opportunities for market players [Du et al. (2016)]. 
According to the literature on the topic, CIP deviations since mid-2014 mainly have been 
driven by large demand and supply imbalances in the FX and currency swap markets, or as 
Du et al. (2016) show, by a combination of “global imbalances” and costly financial 
intermediation. On the one hand, there has been an excess demand for US dollars in the FX 
derivative markets against some other currencies, driven by monetary policy divergences 
across countries. On the other, high demand has not been met with enough supply of US 
dollars (i.e. not enough lenders of US dollars). As a result, the basis is large and negative for 
some currencies such as the euro and the yen, signaling a significant and persistent premium 
for borrowing US dollars against these currencies in the FX swap and the cross-currency 
basis swap markets. Interestingly, and as Borio et al. (2016) points out, whereas demand 
factors explain why the basis opens up, supply factors explain why it does not close. 
Turning first to demand imbalances, which mainly consist of an excessive demand for US 
dollars, the main driver has been probably the monetary policy divergence between the 
US vis-à-vis the ECB and the BOJ, particularly since 2014 [Iida et al. (2016)]. This is not a 
SOURCES: Datastream, BofAML, authors’ calculations.
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mere coincidence: the Federal Reserve (Fed) ended bond purchases in 2014 after gradually 
reducing them since the end of 2013 (“Fed tapering”). The tightening of the Fed contrasted 
with further easing by the ECB and the BOJ. For instance, in September 2014 the ECB 
announced its ABS purchase programme and a refi rate cut. Later on, at the beginning of 
2015, the ECB announced a QE programme. Finally, the ECB corporate bond purchase 
programme, announced at the beginning of 2016, helped reducing bond spreads in the 
euro area further. Monetary policy divergences across areas created incentives for 
investors located in the euro area and Japan to acquire US dollar denominated-assets in 
a “search for yield” behavior, and made it more attractive for (non-financial) companies 
located in the US to issue in foreign-currencies (“reverse Yankees”19). At least some of 
these investors and issuers hedged their assets and liabilities through FX and currency 
swaps.20 Evidence in favor of divergent monetary policies driving CIP deviations has been 
found by e.g. Du et al. (2016), Avdjiev et al. (2016) and Iida et al. (2016). Liao (2016) points 
to cross-currency issuance by non-financial companies as an independent driver of long-
term CIP deviations.
In addition, another important source of US dollar hedging demand has been attributed to 
banks [Borio et al. (2016), Sushko et al. (2016), BIS (2016) and Barclays (2015)]. This can 
be proxied by large US dollar funding gaps, or US dollar mismatches between assets and 
liabilities, of certain banks,21 which have been particularly large for Japanese banks. 
Currency mismatches of these banks were already large before the crisis and continued to 
increase in recent years, in parallel to monetary policy divergences between Japan and the 
US. By contrast, some euro area banks have changed their role after the crisis from 
arbitrageurs of the CIP (i.e. lenders of US dollars) to that of borrowers of US dollars (see 
Chart 5 in section 5). Hence, even if large opportunistic US dollar bond issuance by euro 
area banks in recent years could have increased their supply of US dollars in the FX swap 
and the currency swap markets, on a net basis, euro area banks currently demand more 
US dollars than what they supply in these markets. This has been further exacerbated by 
monetary policy divergences as well as potentially by some regulatory reforms, such as the 
US MMF reform. The latter reform, which became effective in October 2016, increased 
the cost of acquiring US dollars as prime MMFs in the US substantially reduced their 
holdings of short-term debt securities issued by banks (such as commercial paper and 
certificates of deposits), particularly by French and Japanese banks. This could have 
added more pressure to the short-term basis, as banks in net demand of dollars may 
have turned to FX swap markets to obtain US dollar funding.22 
We turn now to supply imbalances in FX and currency swap markets as an explanation of 
the persisting deviations from CIP. These imbalances have been linked mostly to regulatory 
changes affecting banks, as well as tighter risk management by banks and more scrutiny 
19  Reverse Yankees are one example of synthetic US dollar funding, in which a non-financial company located in the 
US issues in euros given its lower cost vis-à-vis funding in US dollars. These issuers would transform the euro de-
nominated bond into a synthetic US dollar bond using a cross-currency swap by borrowing US dollars, contributing 
to put further downward pressure on the basis. Reverse Yankee issuance by US non-financial corporations in-
creased from €32 bln in 2013 to € 70 bln in 2016, the highest amount ever, probably enhanced by the ECB corpo-
rate purchase programme. However, issuance in yen by US non-financial corporations has been more modest 
(around € 1 bln in 2016), given perhaps the smaller size of the Japanese corporate bond market (Borio et al., 2016). 
20  According to Liao (2016), whereas debt issuers tend to match the maturity of the swap to that of their foreign-cur-
rency denominated bonds, institutional investors use short-dated FX forwards and roll them over. 
21  As mentioned before, whenever on-balance sheet US dollar assets (such as loans and bonds) are larger than US 
dollar liabilities, it is assumed that this mismatch is offset with off-balance sheet hedging instruments such as FX and 
currency swaps.
22  However, according to some analysts [JP Morgan (2016)], it is unlikely that banks completely replaced their prime 
MMF funding with FX swaps, given their high cost.
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by the public to banks since the crisis [Du et al. (2016), Iida et al. (2016) and Liao (2016)]. 
Regulatory changes may have created balance-sheet constraints for arbitrage activities of 
banks. In other words, global banks may not only have contributed to a wider basis by 
hedging their large US dollar investments through the FX and cross-currency swap 
markets, but also they may not have been able to actively arbitrage the basis, as they used 
to do before the crisis [e.g. Du et al. (2016)]. Hence, in spite of large opportunistic issuance 
of US dollar-denominated debt by euro area banks (see section 3), this has not been 
enough to close the basis, potentially due to regulatory constraints of banks. This 
notwithstanding, Iida et al. (2016) propose that these regulatory reforms also could have 
reduced the link between CIP deviations and non-US banks’ credit risk, potentially avoiding 
wide deviations of CIP during periods of stress. Moreover, banks are perceived as safer, 
given higher and stricter regulatory requirements. 
Recent studies suggest that there are various regulatory reforms which could negatively 
affect arbitrage in the FX and currency swap markets. First, the Basel III leverage ratio, to 
be implemented from 2018 onwards, requires banks to maintain at least 3% of Tier 1 
equity over their an exposure measure, which includes both on-balance and off-balance 
sheet items as well as derivatives [BCBS (2011 and 2016)]. Moreover, the systematically 
important financial institutions in the US need to meet the enhanced “Supplementary 
Leverage Ratio”, which settles a higher threshold and may further impede upon arbitrage 
in FX and cross-currency swap markets. Du et al. (2016) show larger quarter-end deviations 
of the (short-term) basis since 2015, when European banks started to calculate their 
leverage ratio based on their quarter-end balance sheets. 
Second, Basel III has not only increased capital requirements of banks, but also it has 
introduced a capital charge for potential mark-to-market losses of “Over-The-Counter” 
(OTC) derivatives [Accenture (2015) and EBA (2015)]. This, combined with more cautious 
management practices, has led arbitrageurs to take into account both market and 
counterparty risk in the valuation of their derivative portfolios, increasing de-facto banks’ 
balance sheet constraints and driving the basis wider [Suhko et al. (2016) and Borio et 
al. (2016)]. Moreover, risk management practices based on Value at Risk (VaR) frameworks 
have also contributed to deviations from CIP, as they put constraints on bank balance 
sheets and reduced bank-related arbitrage activities in FX swap markets [Avdjiev et al. 
(2016) and Du et al. (2016)]. 
Third, Basel III has increased liquidity requirements for banks through the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR), which has been binding since 2015. This ratio requires that banks 
have sufficient high-quality liquid assets to cover potential outflows of liabilities for a 30-
day period. This could mean that there is potentially less cash available to take positions 
in currency swap markets, as these funds may be invested in other liquid assets in order 
to meet the LCR requirements [Barclays (2015)]. Finally, Arai et al. (2016) and Iida et al. 
(2016) suggest that regulatory reforms may have discouraged market-making by banks in 
the FX swap market, reducing liquidity in these markets and increasing transaction costs. 
Du et al. (2016) also mention the prohibition of US banks to engage in proprietary trading 
in FX forwards and swaps (Volcker Rule) and OTC derivative reforms as responsible for 
increasing the costs of arbitrage in the FX swap and currency swap markets of banks [see 
also IMF (2017)]. 
The question arises as to whether there are other non-bank market players that are less 
affected by regulation, which potentially could arbitrage the basis and help putting an end 
to CIP deviations. It has been documented that high-grade entities, such as supranational 
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organizations and national agencies, may act as arbitrageurs of the basis through the 
issuance of synthetic domestic currency debt (i.e. issuance of hedged US dollar bonds) 
[e.g. Barclays (2015)]. Real money investors, which comprise asset managers, sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs) and foreign official reserve managers, in many cases located in 
emerging market economies, could also play a role, although doubts arise with respect to 
their stability as US dollar providers in the derivatives markets (see section 5) [Iida et al. 
(2016)]. In any case, the fact that the basis is still considerably in negative territory shows 
that arbitrage by banking and non-banking entities is still not sufficient to close the gap. 
Hence, more research is needed to identify the barriers hindering arbitrage of CIP 
deviations for several currencies. 
In previous sections we have described the reliance of euro area banks on US dollar 
markets, which points to growing international connections of banks, in spite of the recent 
crises. Hence, it seems important to carefully analyze the access of European and other 
non-US banks to the various US dollar funding markets from a financial stability point of 
view: monitoring only the domestic currency funding environment would provide a partial 
picture of banks’ potential vulnerabilities and of potential spillovers to the stability of the 
whole financial system.23 Of course, funding in US dollars by banks is linked directly to 
their assets in this currency and their asset-liability management practices. Hence, we 
begin this section providing an overview of the development of US dollar mismatches of 
euro area and Japanese banking systems and their reliance on FX swaps and currency 
swaps to obtain US dollars. Second, we will reflect on how alternative non-bank providers 
of US dollars, particularly in the FX swap markets, can create additional risks to the 
financial system, given that little is known about their behavior in case of market distress 
or in case of tighter US monetary policy.
Chart 5 shows the difference between US dollar denominated-foreign liabilities for euro 
area and Japanese banks and their US dollar denominated-foreign claims (i.e. US dollar 
lending). The difference is negative, particularly for Japanese banks, which means that 
these banks have a “US dollar funding gap”, meaning that their liabilities in US dollars are 
not enough to cover their assets in US dollars. Hence, in spite of large US dollar bond 
issuance by euro area banks since 2011, their US dollar denominated liabilities are currently 
lower than their US dollar denominated assets.24 In addition, on aggregate for all non-US 
banks, the difference between their foreign claims and foreign liabilities in US dollars has 
rapidly increased from the lows recorded during the global financial crisis and the euro 
area financial crisis [Nakaso (2017)]. In general, a US dollar funding gap can be problematic 
in two ways. First, the most obvious risk is that when non-US banks cannot obtain US 
dollars to fund their US dollar assets, their domestic central bank has to step in to provide 
limited US dollar liquidity assistance25 [IMF (2017)]. The second problem arises from the 
growing reliance of non-US banks on the FX swap and currency swap markets to fund or 
hedge their US dollar mismatches.
Even if banks are able to obtain these US dollars through FX and currency swaps, these 
instruments create a whole new set of specific risks for banks. We will focus on just two of 
them [for the full overview, see Eklund et al. (2012)]. The first one is counterparty risk, that 
is, the risk that the counterparty in the swap defaults on its payments. Counterparty risk 
23  This has been recently and explicitly acknowledge by the Nakaso (2017).
24  This is of course in aggregated terms, as net positions at the euro area country level vary considerably. 
25  In fact, the US dollar swap lines established for the first time in 2007 and 2008 between the Fed and several other 
central banks alleviated this problem in the context of US dollar shortage during the global financial crisis. 
5  Spillovers to 
international financial 
stability
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increases with the term of the swap, as the volatility of the currencies exchanged grows 
over time. The second risk is refinancing or rollover risk. In general, refinancing risk arises 
every time one entity funds long-term assets with shorter-term liabilities, as sometime in the 
future the entity needs to obtain new financing to fund its assets. A European or Japanese 
bank with a long-term US dollar denominated-asset may decide to hedge it with a shorter-
term FX swap and roll it over until the asset matures. This creates a “US dollar maturity 
mismatch” and exposes the bank to the risk that the counterparty does not want to renew 
the swap or the costs of renewing the FX swap increase substantially. In that case, the bank 
may be forced to sell the US dollar asset, which may be difficult in case of market distress 
[McGuire and Von Peter (2009b)]. The second option is to match the maturity of the asset 
with a longer-term cross-currency swap. Of course, the longer the term of the swap, the 
lower the refinancing risk. But as we have seen, the longer the tenor of the swap, the greater 
the counterparty risk is too.
In case many banks follow a similar hedging pattern, this can create risks for the whole 
financial system. For instance, before the global financial crisis, Japanese and some 
European banks did not only have a “US dollar funding gap”, but had a “US dollar maturity 
mismatch” as well. According to McGuire and Von Peter (2009a and 2009b), the large 
increase of US dollar denominated assets before the crisis for some European banking 
systems was mostly funded through short-term liabilities such as FX swaps, interbank 
loans and central bank borrowings. The increase in liquidity and counterparty risk since 
mid-2007, linked to the global financial crisis, led to severe dislocations in the FX swap 
and other short-term markets. This, coupled with less funding from US MMFs for European 
banks, forced them to either sell their structured products at large discounts or to lengthen 
the maturity of their assets, further contributing to global US dollar shortages. Fender and 
McGuire (2010) show that maturity mismatches of those European banking systems that 
were long in US dollars at that time fell right after the crisis, but did not disappear 
completely. As of today, foreign currency maturity mismatches continue to persist for 
banks in advanced economies [IMF (2017)]. 
In order to avoid an excessive reliance of non-US banks on FX and currency swap markets 
and an escalating pressure on the basis, having accessible alternative US dollar funding 
markets is of vital importance. This was recently epitomized by the US MMF reform, where 
there is some evidence that non-US high-grade banks may have replaced partly their US 
dollar denominated commercial paper and certificates of deposits with longer-term debt 
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securities, avoiding a US dollar funding shortage [BIS (2017)].26 This could have helped 
driving US dollar debt issuance by banks higher in 2016 [Reuters (2016); see also section 3]. 
In this line, Nakaso (2017) shows that following the reform, Japanese banks mostly 
replaced MMF funding with more US dollar-denominated deposits, bonds and repos. All in 
all, it is important to monitor US dollar funding conditions and markets in general and not 
focus on just one specific source of US dollar funding. 
Another potential source of vulnerabilities to the financial system is related to non-bank 
arbitrageurs of CIP deviations. As mentioned before, banks are not the only market players 
with the ability to arbitrage the basis by supplying US dollars in the FX and currency swap 
markets. There is certain evidence, particularly for the Yen/USD FX swap market, of a 
greater weight of other suppliers of US dollars such as real money investors [Iida et al. 
(2016), Arai et al. (2016) and Nakaso (2017)]. 
The main problem is that it is unclear how stable these suppliers of US dollars are in the 
long-run. Actually, there are some signs suggesting that these investors as not very reliable, 
meaning that they could rapidly withdraw their supply of US dollars in certain circumstances 
[Iida et al. (2016)]. For instance, it has been documented that real money investors have 
increased their investments in Japanese government bonds (JGBs) on a FX hedged basis 
[Arai et al. (2016)]. The arbitrage works in a similar way to the issuance of “synthetic euro 
bonds” by euro area banks, as documented in section 2. Real money investors investing in 
JGBs would obtain yen funding through the FX swap or currency swap market and exchange 
US dollars in return.27 This means that the real money investor would be paying the 
“negative” basis and earn a positive hedged return through the investment in JGBs, equal 
to or even higher than that of investing in US Treasury securities, in spite of very low or even 
negative yields on JGBs (see Figure 3).28 Of course, it is clear that these investors are only 
willing to swap their US dollar holdings in the FX or currency swap markets as long as these 
trades are profitable. When this is no longer the case, they may disappear as a source of 
dollar funding. In general, real money investors, particularly those located in emerging 
economies, could cut their US dollar lending in FX swap markets in times of market distress. 
For instance, it seems that emerging market foreign exchange reserve managers tend to 
reduce their US dollar supply in the FX swap markets when they need to defend their 
currencies  [Iida et al. (2016)]. In the same vein, there are signs that sovereign wealth funds 
reduce their supply of US dollars in the FX swap markets when the fiscal situation of their 
countries worsen, for example due to lower commodity prices [Arai et al. (2016)].
This has led some to wonder what will happen when the tightening cycle of the Fed 
progresses further, causing higher funding costs and a stronger US dollar. As Nakaso 
(2017) explains, a tightening by the Fed may have a negative impact on the economic 
growth of emerging countries by reducing oil prices and unleashing capital outflows and 
depreciation pressures on their currencies. This would lead to lower supply of US dollars 
in the FX swap markets by real money investors located in these countries, causing larger 
CIP deviations, a wider basis (i.e. higher costs for obtaining US dollars in FX currency 
swap markets) and higher costs of US dollar funding for banks (both directly in cash 
26  According to the BIS (2017), non-US banks also replaced their US MMF funding with dollar deposits and excess 
reserves at the Fed. 
27  Evidence point to arbitrage mainly through the shorter-term FX swap market, but in order to make it clearer for the 
reader and consistent with previous figures, Figure 3 depicts a CCBS instead. The underlying idea would be the same 
in both cases. 
28  These potential positive hedged returns of investing in JGBs could explain the rapid increase in China’s holdings of 
Japanese debt securities in 2015 and 2016 [Van Rixtel and Xu (2017)].
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markets and in the FX swap and currency swap markets). This would reduce US dollar-
denominated lending, also to entities located in emerging economies, contributing to 
lower economic growth, which would reduce further the supply of US dollars in the FX 
swap markets from investors based in these countries. In this line, Avdjiev et al. (2016) and 
Shin (2016) show that an appreciation of the dollar is associated with more pronounced 
deviations from CIP. In all this, monetary policy and differences in the monetary policy 
stance of the major central banks play a crucial role. He et al. (2015) empirically show the 
expansionary effect of the unconventional monetary policy by the Federal Reserve on 
the supply of cross-border credit by global banks. Interestingly, the authors conclude that the 
negative effects on global liquidity of a tightening by the Federal Reserve would be partly 
offset by the expansionary monetary policies of the ECB and BOJ: abundant and cheap 
supply of domestic currency would provide collateral for euro area and Japanese banks 
in the FX swap markets. The net effect would depend, however, on whether the tightening 
by the Fed would increase global risk aversion in international markets or not. 
In conclusion, deviations from CIP as measured by the US dollar FX swap and CCBS basis 
are indicators of the risks to the global banking system derived from banks’ international 
activities, which generate cross-currency funding needs that are to a large extent 
denominated in US dollars. Moreover, deviations from CIP can also be used as a measure 
for the “procyclicality of international financial intermediation” driven by the interconnection 
of banks and non-bank US dollar providers in the FX swap markets [Nakaso (2017)]. 
Careful monitoring of cross-border activities of banks as well as their dependency on non-
banking providers of US dollars would further contribute to the safety of the financial 
system. 
In this article we have described how US dollar long-term funding by euro area banks has 
been increasing since the global financial crisis, particularly in relative terms. In Romo 
González (2016), which studies US dollar bond issuance by European banks between 
2005 and the beginning of 2013, it is shown that banks could have issued US dollar-
denominated debt for opportunistic factors, as well as for other reasons. In this article we 
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issuance by euro area banks since 2013 up until the first quarter of 2017. We find some 
evidence that high US dollar-denominated bond issuance by euro area banks since 2013 
mainly has been motivated by regulatory developments and strategic drivers, as euro 
area banks would have been benefiting from the appetite of a liquid and diversified US 
dollar investor base. Moreover, the positive correlation between covered cost savings and 
US dollar bond issuance as found in Romo González (2016) seems to be less strong since 
2015. That said, this relationship could still exist for certain bonds, such as those with a 
lower rating and a specific maturity. Moreover, given the close connection between 
covered cost savings for euro area banks and the deviations of CIP, we document the drivers 
of CIP deviations as measured by the CCBS basis. According to the latest research on the 
topic, CIP deviations since mid-2014 have been driven by a combination of demand and 
supply factors. These factors are linked to monetary policy divergences across regions, to 
their impact on global imbalances and possibly to new regulations mainly affecting banks. 
In addition to this, we discuss how impaired access to US dollar markets by non-US banks 
may have negative consequences for the stability of the global financial system. This is so 
because some euro area and Japanese banks still have a large amount of US dollar-
denominated assets which need to be funded in the same currency to avoid “US dollar 
mismatches” or “US dollar funding gaps”. Moreover, US dollar maturity mismatches 
caused by non-US banks hedging long-term US dollar assets with shorter-term FX swaps 
need to be monitored as well, as epitomized by the global financial crisis. Finally, there is 
some evidence pointing to a bigger role of “alternative” US dollar providers located in 
EMEs, particularly in some FX swap markets. Little is known about how reliable these US 
dollar suppliers are in case of market distress. Negative spillovers to EMEs of higher 
US dollar interest rates could disrupt the supply of US dollars coming from these agents. 
Should other agents not be willing to step in, scarcity of US dollars could create risks for 
the global financial system and central banks would need to step in as during the global 
and the euro area financial crises. All these tensions would be reflected in wider CIP 
deviations, which constitutes an excellent measure of the risks to the global banking 
system derived from non-US banks’ international activities. 
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REQUERIMIENTOS DE CAPITAL POR RIESGO DE CONTRAPARTIDA: 
EL NUEVO MÉTODO ESTÁNDAR
Desde el comienzo de la crisis financiera, el Comité Bancario de Basilea ha reformado su 
marco de determinación de requerimientos de capital para las entidades de crédito en un 
intento de hacerlo más racional y más sensible al riesgo. En este intento, el nuevo modelo 
estándar de requerimientos por riesgo de contraparte será la nueva referencia que deberán 
considerar las entidades y está llamado a llenar el vacío existente entre los actuales mode-
los no internos y el interno.
La actividad en los mercados de derivados financieros se ha incrementado notablemente 
durante los últimos veinte años. Este incremento ha sido causado tanto por operaciones de 
cobertura de riesgos económicos subyacentes ajenos a los propios contratos de deriva-
dos como por operaciones sencillamente especulativas. El riesgo de contrapartida puede 
ser definido en un sentido amplio como el riesgo de crédito surgido en esas operaciones 
de derivados y su principal diferencia con respecto al riesgo de crédito tradicional es que 
en este último el importe sometido al potencial impago es conocido de antemano, mientras 
que en aquel no lo es debido a su carácter volátil.
Tradicionalmente, este tipo de riesgo de crédito ha sido percibido como reducido, tanto 
por la propia naturaleza de las entidades participantes en su contratación como por la 
ausencia de una crisis sistémica que obligara a revisar en profundidad esta creencia. En 
este contexto, cuando Lehman Brothers se declaró en quiebra en septiembre de 2008, 
congeló más de 900.000 contratos de derivados, que suponían un 5 % de las transaccio-
nes a nivel global1, y provocó con ello el colapso de los mercados financieros. Además, 
si bien este riesgo, a nivel de entidad individual, no suele aparecer entre los riesgos consi-
derados más importantes, en algunos casos representa la mayor parte de los requerimien-
tos por riesgo de crédito2.
Adicionalmente, y con el propósito de recalcar la importancia de este riesgo, los derivados 
financieros tienen como principal característica que su valor de mercado está determinado 
por la evolución de un activo subyacente. Ante movimientos de este, el valor de aquel se 
puede llegar a multiplicar sustancialmente y puede llegar a comprometer severamente la 
situación patrimonial de una entidad. En segundo lugar, la relación del valor del derivado 
con el activo subyacente en muchos casos no es lineal y resulta difícil de anticipar. Si una 
de las entidades contratantes no ha estimado correctamente las distintas eventualidades 
posibles, puede encontrarse en un escenario donde se haya comprometido su capacidad 
de repago. 
En un artículo anterior del autor3, en esta misma revista, sobre el riesgo de contrapartida 
se describió cómo las entidades de crédito debían reconocer contablemente los riesgos 
asociados al uso de estos contratos derivados y, por otro lado, cómo habían de cubrir con 
capital eventuales deterioros crediticios asociados a ellos.
1 Para mayor detalle, véase Fleming (2014).
2 En este sentido, véase European Banking Authority (2016).
3 A este respecto, véase el artículo citado de Gil y Manzano (2013).
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Desde aquel entonces, el marco regulatorio prudencial ha continuado avanzando en dis-
tintas direcciones. Por un lado, se ha establecido un marco específico para las Cámaras 
de Contrapartida Central desde el Banco Internacional de Pagos de Basilea (BIS, o el 
Comité). Por otro, se ha establecido la obligatoriedad de incorporar en categorías de 
derivados OTC la presencia de Cámaras de Contrapartida Central (CCP). Y, finalmente, se 
ha reformado sustancialmente el modo en que las entidades de crédito han de calcular los 
requerimientos de capital por riesgo de contraparte.
El propósito de este artículo es describir en detalle este último punto. El anterior marco 
prudencial ha sido criticado fundamentalmente por no reconocer apropiadamente los 
efectos mitigadores derivados de la existencia de acuerdos tanto de reposición de colate-
rales como de compensación contractual. Este nuevo marco nace con el propósito de 
mejorar el tratamiento de estos dos elementos mitigadores y de poder ser utilizado por 
CCP4, las cuales han de facilitar la liquidación centralizada de derivados. 
El nuevo marco estándar de requerimientos por riesgo de contraparte será el encargado 
de calcular la cifra de exposición al riesgo de crédito, base del cálculo de los requerimien-
tos de capital. Para ello, las entidades habrán de sumar un valor de mercado neto de co-
laterales intercambiados y una estimación regulatoria de la exposición potencial futura de 
aquellos derivados incluidos en un mismo conjunto compensable de operaciones con una 
misma contraparte.
Es opinión del autor que este nuevo marco será capaz de ofrecer cifras de requerimientos 
mínimos de capital más ajustadas a los riesgos efectivamente asumidos. Es decir, será 
más sensible al riesgo. Finalmente, a pesar del reconocimiento más favorable de los 
acuerdos de colateralización y de compensación contractual, y a pesar de estudios con-
tradictorios que existen a este respecto y que serán considerados posteriormente, el re-
sultado global de la implantación del modelo parece que producirá cifras de requerimien-
tos superiores a las preexistentes.
En un primer bloque del artículo se describirá el marco propuesto por el BIS. En un segundo, 
se describirá la respuesta europea al citado marco. Y, por último, se presentarán las conclu-
siones del autor a este respecto.
Este nuevo marco elaborado por el BIS será el encargado de sustituir los anteriores 
Método de Valoración a Precios de Mercado (CEM) y Método Estándar (SA). Tanto el 
propio Comité como la industria han coincidido en señalar que una de las principales debi-
lidades identificadas respecto del primero de ellos ha sido la falta de discriminación entre 
posiciones colateralizadas y sin colateralizar a través de acuerdos de reposición de már-
genes en el cálculo de exposiciones potenciales futuras5. Resulta necesario destacar el 
papel central que desempeñan estos acuerdos de reposición de márgenes en los merca-
dos de derivados hoy en día6. También se ha señalado lo arbitrario e insensible al riesgo 
realmente asumido del componente de cuantificación de la exposición potencial futura y, 
por último, el tratamiento excesivamente simplista de los acuerdos de compensación 
4 Véase para un mayor detalle Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) y Wayne y White (2012).
5 Véase Wayne y White (2012) y Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014).
6  Un acuerdo de reposición de colateral es una manera efectiva de mitigación del riesgo de contraparte y consiste en 
el intercambio de colateral entre las distintas partes a medida que varía el valor de mercado de los derivados referi-
dos en estos acuerdos. Estos acuerdos consideran un margen de variación (margin call), que será intercambiado 
durante la vida del contrato a medida que resulte necesario, y en ocasiones un margen inicial (initial margin), que será 
depositado al comienzo de la vida del contrato. Véase, a estos efectos, Gregory (2010) y Leif Andersen (2017).
2  Nuevo marco estándar 
de requerimientos por 
riesgo de contraparte
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contractual7. En su beneficio hay que señalar que ha resultado ser un método amplia-
mente utilizado por las entidades debido a su sencillez y a la facilidad de interpretar los 
resultados obtenidos.
En cuanto al segundo de los métodos, el SA, tal y como señala el propio BIS, aunque es 
más sensible al riesgo, no ha diferenciado tampoco entre operaciones colateralizadas y 
sin colateralizar en el cálculo de las exposiciones futuras; tampoco ha capturado adecua-
damente las volatilidades realmente observadas durante períodos de tensión; la definición 
de conjunto de operaciones compensables ha sido compleja, lo cual derivaba en que una 
misma situación en distintas entidades pudiera llegar a ser tratada de distintas maneras; 
la relación entre exposición actual y exposición futura no ha estado resuelta de un modo 
incontrovertido, toda vez que solo se podía capitalizar una de ellas; finalmente, ha sido un 
método concebido para aquellas entidades que deseaban prescindir de las cargas aso-
ciadas a la implantación de un modelo interno, pero en la práctica ha seguido necesitando 
de la modelización de las sensibilidades en las posiciones no lineales por parte de las 
propias entidades, tras aprobación previa del supervisor8. 
Por todo lo anterior, el BIS ha presentado el Nuevo Método Estándar de Cálculo de Re-
querimientos por Riesgo de Contrapartida (SA-CCR), que sustituirá a los anteriormente 
citados. Entre los principales objetivos declarados por el BIS está el poder ser implantado 
de manera satisfactoria para un amplio abanico de operaciones, tanto colateralizadas 
como sin colateralizar, bilaterales (OTC) o liquidadas a través de CCP. Adicionalmente, se 
pretende que sea un modelo fácil de implementar, que supere el máximo número de las 
limitaciones presentes en las alternativas previamente existentes, que utilice en la medida 
de lo posible alternativas prudenciales ya existentes, que minimice la discrecionalidad de 
las autoridades nacionales y que mejore la sensibilidad al riesgo realmente asumido por las 
entidades sin crear complejidades innecesarias.
El marco de requerimientos prudenciales de capital por riesgo de contraparte está incluido 
en el más general riesgo de crédito. Este último tiene como propósito obligar a las entida-
des a cubrir con capital la eventualidad del impago crediticio de sus contrapartes. De ma-
nera análoga, los requerimientos por riesgo de contraparte tienen como objeto cubrir esa 
misma eventualidad, pero referida, fundamentalmente, al conjunto de los derivados OTC. 
La especificidad de estos últimos con respecto a la inversión crediticia tradicional es que 
adquieren valor monetario o lo pierden en respuesta a movimientos de un activo subya-
cente. Ello supone la presencia de un componente volátil del que carece, por lo general, 
la inversión crediticia.
Adicionalmente, y aunque no es objeto directo de este artículo, conviene recordar que 
estos requerimientos son calculados en paralelo a los surgidos por ajuste de valoración 
7  Generalmente, cuando las entidades contratan varios productos financieros derivados con una misma contra-
parte, entra dentro de lo posible que algunos adquieran un valor positivo para sus intereses, y otros, lo contrario. 
El propósito de los conjuntos compensables de operaciones (netting) es que las exposiciones de distinto signo 
que se puedan generar en ellos se puedan compensar entre sí, reduciendo el nivel de exposición neta con una 
misma contraparte. Para que esto resulte posible, se ha de firmar un acuerdo de compensación contractual, que 
se aplicará ante la eventualidad de un default. Existe la posibilidad de tener firmado más de un acuerdo de 
compensación contractual por contraparte. Para mayor detalle, véase Gregory (2010). Para un conocimiento 
pormenorizado de los requisitos que han de cumplir las entidades para lograr el pleno reconocimiento prudencial 
del netting, véase Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo (2013).
8  Solo dos entidades de la Unión Europea han aplicado este método [European Banking Authority (2016)]. Es 
opinión del autor que esta falta de popularidad ha sido debida a que es un método que, sin conseguir la sen-
sibilidad del enfoque avanzado IMM, requería de la modelización interna de deltas asociadas a las posiciones 
no lineales y de la validación supervisora de estas. Para mayor detalle sobre lo comentado, consultar Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) y Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo (2013).
2.1 OBJETIVO
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crediticio (CVA). Si bien no resulta incontrovertido el posible solapamiento entre ambas 
cargas9, tanto el BIS como el ordenamiento jurídico comunitario lo han resuelto permitien-
do reducir el importe del ajuste contable por CVA de la cifra de exposición por riesgo de 
contraparte y siendo la exposición calculada por riesgo de contraparte la base de cálculo 
del requerimiento prudencial por CVA.
Los requerimientos de recursos propios para cubrir el riesgo de contrapartida se basan en 
el tratamiento del riesgo de crédito surgido de la inversión crediticia, que tiene como fór-
mula base para su cálculo la siguiente:
Requerimientos riesgo de crédito = EAD × ƒ (PD, LGD, M, )                     [1]
Esta fórmula es la empleada por el enfoque avanzado, método IRB10, para el cálculo de 
las ponderaciones de riesgo (RW o(.) ), que tiene como inputs la probabilidad de impago 
(PD), la severidad (LGD), el vencimiento remanente (M) y, finalmente, la correlación o grado 
de dispersión de la cartera crediticia ().
RW o ƒ (PD, LGD, M, ) = LGD ×  (  
–1 (PD) + √ –1 (0,999) ) × MA (PD, M)           [2]
Esta forma de calcular las ponderaciones es compartida por el riesgo de crédito y por el riesgo 
de contrapartida, encontrándose la diferencia en el modo en que se calculan las exposiciones. 
El nuevo marco SA-CCR calcula la citada exposición para cada uno de los distintos conjun-
tos de operaciones compensables que pudiera tener una entidad. Esta exposición tiene 
como objetivo replicar de cierta manera la obtenida mediante el método de los modelos 
internos (IMM), el cual emplea un multiplicador  y una Exposición Efectiva Esperada (EEPE). 
Para el SA-CCR, esta EEPE a nivel de conjunto compensable es calculada como sigue:
EAD =  x (RC + PFE)                                                      [3]
Donde = 1,4, RC representa el coste de reposición o valor de mercado neto actual, y 
PFE, la exposición potencial futura. Esta fórmula recuerda a la ya conocida del CEM, pero 
difieren ambas en dos importantes aspectos. El primero de ellos, la introducción del factor 
multiplicativo alfa, y el segundo, el nuevo tratamiento dado a las operaciones colateraliza-
das dentro la fórmula del SA-CCR.
RC pretende representar bajo este marco una estimación conservadora del importe que 
una entidad perdería si la contraparte impagara en el momento de su cálculo. Por el con-
trario, PFE representa el incremento en la exposición que se podría producir desde hoy 
hasta el momento de presentarse el impago y está directamente relacionado con la vola-
tilidad asociada al tipo de productos.
Para conjuntos compensables sin acuerdos de intercambio de colateral, RC representa la 
pérdida que ocurriría si la contrapartida impagara inmediatamente. Si ello sucediera, y en 
ausencia de colaterales, RC sería igual a máx(Valor de mercado actual;0). Nótese que, 
9   Para detalles al respecto, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) y Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo (2013).
10  Mencionar, únicamente, que aquellas entidades que hayan optado por el método estándar proceden al cálculo 
de sus RW en función de ratings emitidos por agencias de calificación o aplicando las ponderaciones preestable-
cidas a tal efecto.
2.2  EXPOSURE 
AT DEFAULT (EAD)
2.3 COSTE DE REPOSICIÓN
√ (1 – ) 
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en el hipotético caso de que este coste de reposición o valor de mercado resultara nega-
tivo, ello supondría un riesgo de crédito para la contraparte, pero no para la hipotética 
entidad objeto de nuestro análisis11.
No obstante, es posible que existan acuerdos de compensación sin acuerdos de inter-
cambio de colateral, pero que, a pesar de ello, cuenten con colateral intercambiado. Este 
colateral, es definido como Importe de Colateral Independiente (ICA) y es intercambiado 
en el comienzo de la operación. Este puede ser entregado o puede ser recibido. El recibi-
do reducirá la exposición en caso de impago y tendrá signo positivo a efectos de su inclu-
sión en la fórmula correspondiente. El entregado puede ser perdido en la eventualidad del 
impago salvo que se encontrara situado en una cuenta a la cual no afectara el posible 
impago. Todo lo anterior se resume en una cifra, el Importe de Colateral Independiente 
Neto (NICA), que tendrá signo positivo si el colateral recibido excede del entregado, y que 
de esta manera contribuirá a reducir la exposición. 
En conjuntos compensables sin colateralizar, todo el colateral ha de provenir por defini-
ción en exclusiva de NICA y el RC es obtenido restando del valor de mercado neto del 
conjunto compensable el valor del posible colateral entregado inicialmente y ajustado en 
su valoración:
RC noMargin = max {V – C CE (1 Year); 0}                                     [4]
Este valor ajustado del colateral (C CE ) es obtenido tras aplicar un ajuste por volatilidad a 
él; negativo, si el valor del colateral es positivo, y a la inversa. El importe del ajuste por 
volatilidad del colateral dependerá del horizonte temporal considerado. Por defecto, el 
horizonte temporal será de un año en el caso de los conjuntos compensables sin inter-
cambio de colateral12 y el Período de Margen por Riesgo (MPR) en el caso de los conjun-
tos colateralizados. Este MPR representa el período transcurrido entre el último posteo 
de colateral (margin call) realizado por la contraparte antes de su default y la cancelación de 
las operaciones tras la declaración del impago. 
El RC es interpretado, por tanto, como la pérdida que podría producirse si la contrapartida 
de una entidad impagara en un momento indeterminado del año siguiente el valor de mer-
cado del conjunto compensable de operaciones referido. Debido a la incertidumbre aso-
ciada al momento del impago, el valor de mercado neto del conjunto compensable neto 
de colateral resulta complejo de estimar y el Comité ha establecido una serie de cautelas 
adicionales. Antes de producirse un impago, el Comité estima que el valor de mercado del 
conjunto compensable habrá resultado lo suficientemente elevado como para solicitar la 
reposición de margen o margin call, de existir esta posibilidad. Esto ocurriría cuando el 
valor de mercado, positivo para la entidad, resultara superior a la suma del umbral mínimo 
(TH) más el importe mínimo que se ha de transferir (MTA). Habría que considerar igualmen-
te la posible existencia de NICA.
RC Margin = max {V – C CE (MPR); TH + MTA – NICA; 0}                         [5]
11  Ante la eventualidad descrita, la entidad objeto de nuestra atención sufriría en este caso pérdidas por riesgo 
de mercado. Este puede ser definido como la posibilidad de incurrir en pérdidas, generalmente en la cartera de 
negociación, ante movimientos desfavorables de las variables de mercado.
12  Resulta ser el mismo período base de cálculo elegido por el Comité para el cálculo de los requerimientos míni-
mos de capital por riesgo de crédito. En otras palabras, estos requerimientos pretenden ser una aproximación 
prudente de las pérdidas que se pueden llegar a producir en el transcurso de un año.
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La fórmula [4] es la que se ha de aplicar en los casos de conjuntos compensables sin in-
tercambio de colateral, y la [5], la correspondiente a conjuntos colateralizados. Por último, 
es necesario considerar la existencia de un último límite: [5] no puede resultar superior a 
[4] con el objeto de prevenir situaciones en las cuales los umbrales mínimos hubieran 
resultado demasiado elevados y su cálculo pudiera derivar en requerimientos punitivos 
para los conjuntos colateralizados de las entidades.
El nuevo acuerdo ha refinado este componente con respecto a los modelos no internos 
previamente existentes haciéndolo más sensible al riesgo.
El SA-CCR define el PFE como el producto de un recargo (add-on) a nivel de conjunto 
compensable y un multiplicador dependiente de la ratio de exceso de colateral neto reci-
bido y ajustado en su valoración sobre el ya citado add-on. El objetivo del multiplicador es 
reconocer la presencia de posibles excesos en el colateral neto entregado sobre el valor 
de mercado de los derivados produciendo menor PFE:
PFE = W (         V – C CE       ) x Add-on aggregate                                  [6]
El add-on pretende ser una estimación prudente de la EEPE de cumplirse todas y cada 
una de las siguiente condiciones: el valor de mercado de cada transacción individual es 
cero, no se ha posteado ni recibido ningún colateral, no hay intercambios de efectivo du-
rante el horizonte temporal previsto y la evolución del valor de mercado sigue un movi-
miento browniano aritmético de media cero y volatilidad fija. Todas las condiciones ante-
riores son necesarias para permitir que el add-on agregado sea una función lineal de la 
volatilidad del valor de mercado del conjunto compensable.
A nivel de una transacción individual i, el valor de mercado según el modelo subyacente 
en el nuevo SA-CCR, en un momento t cualquiera, puede ser representado bajo las asun-
ciones previas como sigue:
V i (t) = 1 {M 
t 
≥t} i √ t X i                                                     [7]
Donde el primer término de la ecuación de la derecha es una variable booleana,  i es la vo-
latilidad del valor de mercado de la transacción i, M i es el vencimiento residual y X i es una 
variable aleatoria estándar normal. De manera parecida, para un conjunto compensable13:
V (t) =  (t) √ t Y                                                          [8]
(t) = [ ∑ i,j 1 {M i ≥ t} 1 {M j ≥ t} r ij  i  j  ] ½                                            [9] 
La Expected Exposure14 (EE), o exposición esperada positiva, puede ser definida alge-
braicamente en función de lo anterior como:
EE no-margin (t) = E [max {(t) √ t Y;0}] =  
√2π
  (t) √ t                             [10]
13 Para mayor explicación del proceso seguido, consúltese Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014).
14 Para una detallada explicación de los distintos tipos de exposición, véase Gil y Manzano (2013).
2.4  EXPOSICIÓN POTENCIAL 
FUTURA
2.4.1 Estimación del add-on
Add-on aggregate
1
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Adicionalmente, conviene recordar que el add-on pretende ser una aproximación de la 
EEPE. Todo ello lleva a la siguiente fórmula en el caso de un conjunto compensable sin 
intercambio de colateral:
Add-on aggregate  = 1 year
 ∫ 0 




   
√2π
(t) √ 1 year           [11]
Que, finalmente, y gracias a las hipótesis restrictivas previamente enunciadas:
Add-on aggregate = [ ∑ 
i,j
r ij Add-on i 
no-margin Add-on j 
no-margin ] ½                                      [12]
Add-on i 
no-margin =  
3√2π 
  i √        1 year                                       [13]
Donde el último término de la ecuación [13] reescala el resultado obtenido para aquellas 
operaciones individuales con vencimiento dentro del siguiente año en un intento de evitar 
su sobrerrepresentación en el agregado a través de la compensación con operaciones 
con un vencimiento más dilatado.
En el caso de conjuntos compensables colateralizados, las fórmulas [12] y [13] han de ser 
adaptadas, cambiando el horizonte temporal previamente elegido de 1 año al asociado 
con el MPR correspondiente:
Add-on aggregate = [ ∑ 
i,j
r ij Add-on i 
margin Add-on j 
margin ] ½                           [14]
Add-on i 
margin =   
√2π
    i √  1 year                                          [15]
Una vez establecido el marco teórico de referencia, es interesante resaltar que el punto crí-
tico de la efectiva implantación de [12] y [14] reside en el cálculo de las volatilidades asocia-
das a nivel de transacción. De permitirse a las entidades su modelización, el SA-CCR resul-
taría ser un híbrido entre el anterior SA y el IMM. Así, el Comité ha decidido detallar y 
estandarizar el proceso de su cálculo. A estos efectos, ha establecido que un primer paso 
consiste en asignar cada transacción individual a una de las cinco clases de activos identi-
ficados: tipo de interés (IR), tipo de cambio (FX), crédito, renta variable y materias primas. 
Una vez realizada la asignación entre clases de activos, la entidad ha de aplicar la fórmula 
de cálculo del add-on prudencial, para lo cual habrá de emplear volatilidades y correlacio-
nes previamente calibradas por el regulador para cada una de las categorías de activo. Es-
tas volatilidades y correlaciones son mostradas en el cuadro 2, y nótese que, según lo se-
veras que resulten ser en comparación con las realmente existentes en la cartera típica de 
las entidades, tanto más elevada resultará la cuantificación de los requerimientos de capital.
La fórmula de add-on prudencial mostrada en el nuevo marco SA-CCR es como sigue:
Add-on i 
(trade) =  i d i (a) SF i (a) MF i                                           [16]
 i es el delta de la transacción e informa de la dirección de la posición, positiva o negativa, 
y permite además escalar el add-on en aquellas posiciones no lineales. No se permiten 
estimaciones internas de este parámetro, sino que se han de emplear los valores regulato-
rios suministrados para cada clase de activo. d i 
(a) es el nominal ajustado y tiene como pro-
pósito cuantificar el tamaño de la posición. SF  i 







2 min (M i ;1 year)
MPR
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supervisora de la volatilidad asumida por cada clase de activo. MF i es definido como el 
factor de vencimiento15, cuyo objeto es ajustar el peso de las operaciones con vencimiento 
inferior al año dentro del conjunto de operaciones compensables. La fórmula [16] resulta ser 
equivalente a [13] y [15] mediante la siguiente ecuación:
 i =  
3 SF i 
(a) √2π
  |  i | d i (a)                                                  [17]
Una vez determinado el add-on a nivel de operación, se ha de proceder a su agregación 
a nivel de conjunto de operaciones compensables. Si bien las reglas de agregación pre-
sentan especificidades según la clase de activo, el proceso general se podría visualizar de 
la siguiente manera:
 
El SFS permite la plena compensación de operaciones dentro de un HS. De esta manera:
Add-on j 
(SFS) = ∑ iSFS 
j
 Add-on i 
(trade)                                         [18]
Cada clase de activo puede estar compuesta por distintos HS16, y estos, a su vez, por 
distintos factores de riesgo reconocidos como SFS. Cada HS es el nivel más elevado en 
el cual se permite el reconocimiento de los beneficios asociados a la compensación, si 
bien se ha de considerar en este nivel la existencia de correlaciones entre SFS tal y 
como son proporcionadas por el regulador, lo cual disminuye los beneficios asociados a 
la diversificación:
Add-on m 
(HS) = [ ∑ j,k  HS m  jk Add-on j (SFS) Add-on k (SFS) ] ½                       [19]
Por último, la agregación realizada a nivel de contraparte por conjunto de operaciones 
compensables:
Add-on (no margin) = ∑ m | Add-on m 
(HS) |                                        [20] 
15 MF i 
(no-margin) = √(min {M i ,1 year} ⁄ 1 year  y  MF i margin = 3 ⁄ 2 √ MPR ⁄ 1 year
16  Un HS es definido como el conjunto de operaciones en un acuerdo de compensación contractual para el cual 
se permite la compensación parcial o completa a efectos del cálculo de la PFE.
 Los HS presentes en cada clase de activo reconocida en el SA-CCR son:
– Tipo de interés, un HS por cada divisa.
– FX, un HS por cada par de divisas.
– Crédito, un único HS.
– Renta variable, un único HS.
– Materias primas, cuatro HS.
2
Conjunto de operaciones 
compensables
Operaciones clasificadas por clase 
de activo
Conjunto de operaciones cubiertas (HS)
Subconjunto de operaciones 
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Posteriormente se explica cómo este parámetro es incorporado en el cálculo de los dis-
tintos add-on. Este parámetro ha de ser calculado a nivel de transacción individual y reco-
gerá tanto su tamaño como su vencimiento.
Para derivados de tipo de interés y derivados crediticios, el nominal ajustado es el produc-




 N i SD i                                                            [21]
SD i = 
 exp (–rS i ) – exp (–rE i )
                                               [22]
Siendo 
—
 N i el nominal promedio de la transacción, S i la fecha de comienzo de la operación, 
E i la fecha de finalización
17 y r = 0,05.
Para FX, el nominal ajustado es definido como el nominal de la pata del derivado en mo-
neda extranjera convertida a moneda local. Si ambas patas resultaran estar nominadas en 
moneda extranjera, aquella con mayor valor en moneda local será el nominal ajustado.
Para renta variable y materias primas, el nominal ajustado es definido como el producto 
del precio actual por unidad por el número de unidades referenciadas en cada contrato.
Esta será calculada a nivel de operación y será incorporada en el cálculo de los add-on es-
pecíficos descritos con posterioridad. Este ajuste reflejará tanto la dirección de la opera-
ción como su posible no linealidad.
17  En el SA-CCR se ha de considerar la existencia de cuatro fechas. Dos de ellas aplicables exclusivamente a tipo de 
interés y crédito: S i es la fecha de comienzo de un contrato de derivados y E i es la fecha de finalización de este 
contrato. Adicionalmente, M i es aplicada en todas las categorías de activos y es el vencimiento de un contrato en 
la última fecha donde el contrato pudiera estar activo. A estos efectos, se puede imaginar un swap de tipos de 
interés firmado a día de hoy en el cual los intercambios de efectivo no comenzarán hasta dentro de cinco años y 
donde estos durarán diez años. En este caso, M sería igual a 15, S igual a 5 y E igual a 15. Finalmente, T i es apli-
cable a opciones de toda clase de activos y es la última fecha de ejercicio contemplada en el contrato.
2.4.2 Nominal ajustado d  i 
(a)
2.4.3 Delta de la operación  i
r
FUENTE: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014).
a El valor de esta función resulta de la aplicación de Black-Scholes. Para mayor detalle, véase Hull (2015).
Largo en el factor de riesgo Corto en el factor de riesgo
1–1+ODC in senoicpo on sotnemurtsnI
Opciones compradas Opciones vendidas
Call
Put
Comprado (largo en protección) Vendido (corto en protección)
Tramos CDO
Donde Pi es el precio del subyacente, Ki es el precio de ejercicio y i
un cuadro posterior.  representa una distribución normal acumulada estándar (a).
Ai i es el punto de separación del tramo.
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El siguiente paso es convertir el nominal efectivo en una estimación válida de EEPE. Para 
ello se utiliza un factor o factores específicos por cada clase de activo que incorpora la 
estimación supervisora de volatilidades y correlaciones implícitas en cada HS. Estas esti-
maciones supervisoras se han incluido como cuadro 2.
Este add-on captura el riesgo de tipo de interés surgido de los nominales con distintos 
vencimientos entre los cuales se manifiesta una correlación imperfecta. El SA-CCR divi-
de los derivados de tipos de interés en distintos vencimientos según su fecha de finali-
zación (SFS): menos de un año, entre uno y cinco años y superior a cinco años. Se 
permite la plena compensación dentro de cada categoría de vencimiento, solo parcial-
mente a nivel de HS por moneda, y no se permite ninguna compensación entre distintas 
monedas (HS).
El add-on por riesgo de tipo de interés se calcula como la suma de los add-on a nivel de 
HS. Primero, se ha de calcular el nominal efectivo de cada categoría de vencimiento k en 
un HS j (D jk 
(IR) ):
D jk 
(IR) =∑ iCcy j, MB k ) i d i 
IR MF i 
margin;non-margin                                [23]
Donde d i 
IR es calculado según [21] y  i es extraído del cuadro 1.
En un segundo paso, se agregarán los distintos vencimientos a nivel de HS:
Nominal efectivo j 
IR = [(D j1 IR) 2 + (D j2 IR) 2 + (D j3 IR) 2 + 1,4 D j1 IR D j2 IR + 1,4 D j2 IR D j3 IR + 0,6 D j1 IR D j3 IR]1/2    [24]
Add-on j 
IR = SF j 
IR Nominal efectivo j 
IR                                        [25]18
Add-on IR = ∑ j Add-on j 
IR                                                   [26]
El caso particular de los derivados de tipo de cambio resulta ser a estos efectos un caso 
simplificado del de tipo de interés:
Nominal efectivo j 
FX = ∑ iHSi  i d i 
FX MF i 
margin;non-margin                            [27]
Add-on FX HSj = SF j 
FX | Nominal efectivo j 
FX |                                    [28]
Add-on FX = ∑ j Add-on j 
FX                                                 [29]
En el caso del add-on por derivados de crédito se permiten dos niveles de reconocimien-
to de los beneficios derivados de la diversificación. El primero de ellos, a nivel de cada 
referencia subyacente. En este caso, se permite una plena compensación y hemos de 
hallar un add-on a nivel de cada entidad de referencia k:
Nominal efectivo k 
Crédito = ∑ iEntityk i d i 
Crédito MF i 
margin;non-margin                      [30]
Add-on(Entity k ) = SF k 
Crédito Nominal efectivo k 
Crédito                            [31]
18  Conviene recordar que en el caso del tipo de interés, como puede comprobarse en el cuadro 2, el factor super-
visor es igual al 0,5 %.
2.4.4  Factor supervisor SF i 
(a)
2.4.5  Add-on por tipo de interés 
y por FX
2.4.6  Add-on por crédito 
y por renta variable
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En segundo lugar, estos add-on por referencia han de ser agregados a través de unas 
correlaciones supervisoras estimadas sobre la base de un modelo de factor único que 
permite una compensación parcial basada en correlaciones:
            Add-on Crédito = [ (∑ k k Crédito Add-on( Entity k )) 2 + 
∑ k (1–( k Crédito) 2) (Add-on ( Entity k )) 2 ] 1/2                   [32]
Y los mismos pasos se han de dar en lo referido a la renta variable:
Nominal efectivo k 
Renta variable = ∑ iEntity k  i d i 
Renta variable MF i 
margin;non-margin                [33]
Add-on ( Entity k ) = SFk 
Renta variable Nominal efectivo k 
Renta variable                                [34]
Add-on Renta variable = [ (∑ k k Renta variable Add-on ( Entity k )) 2 + 
∑ k (1 – (  k Renta variable) 2) (Add-on ( Entity k )) 2 ] 1/ 2                [35]
En este caso hemos de contemplar la existencia de distintas subclases de materias pri-
mas que son las que definen el nivel máximo del HS. Así mismo, los beneficios por diver-
sificación a nivel de cada subclase reciben el mismo tratamiento que para el crédito y la 
renta variable:
Nominal efectivo k 
mmpp = ∑ iType
 k
 j   i d i mmpp MF i margin;non-margin                        [36]
Add-on (Type k 
j ) = SF Type
 k
 j Nominal efectivo k 
mmpp                              [37]
Add-onmmpp = [(∑ k j mmpp Add-on (Type k j )) 2 + (1 – ( j mmpp) 2) ∑ k (Add-on (Type k j )) 2 ]1/ 2   [38]
Como un principio general, la sobrecolateralización debería reducir los requerimientos de 
capital por riesgo de contraparte. Como ya se ha comentado previamente, el colateral 
puede reducir tanto el coste de reposición como el PFE.
De una manera algebraica resumida, la EE de un conjunto de operaciones compensables 
es definida19:
EE margin (t) = E (max (V (t) – C (t); 0) )                                           [39]
El SA-CCR no considera variaciones dinámicas en el valor del colateral y asume igualmen-
te que el movimiento del valor del conjunto compensable de derivados sigue un movi-
miento browniano de media nula. Adicionalmente, t será igual al MPR.
V (MPR) = V +  (0) √MPR Y                                                        [40]
Donde (0) es la volatilidad en el momento inicial del conjunto de operaciones compen-
sables y se mantendrá constante durante todo el cálculo e Y es una variable estándar 
normal. 
19 Véase Gregory (2010) y Pykhtin (2010).
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Considerando las dos ecuaciones20 anteriores:
        PFEmargin = [ V – CCE (MPR) ] ((0)     V-CCE (MPR)    ) + 
   
(0)
           ((0)    V-CCE (MPR)     )              [41]
y =       
V-CCE (MPR)                                                       
 [42]
Donde (.) es una variable aleatoria normal acumulada y (.) es una variable aleatoria 
normal. En este punto resulta necesario destacar que el coste de reposición o valor neto 
de mercado no es deducido de la PFE planteada. De esta manera, en los casos en los 
cuales el valor neto de mercado del conjunto compensable sea superior al valor del cola-
teral neto, las entidades habrán de computar sus requerimientos de capital separadamente 
para los componentes del coste de reposición y para la PFE. 
Recordar que, por definición, el multiplicador es igual a la ratio PFE sobre Add-on. De esta 
manera se llega a la formulación teórica definitiva, la cual es mostrada en el gráfico 1, 
definida como curva del modelo inicial.
W model (y) = min { 1; y (0) y] +  (0) y]  }                                [43]
La fórmula [42] está basada en la asunción de que el valor neto de mercado del conjunto 
de operaciones compensables de derivados está normalmente distribuido. No obstante, 
el Comité adopta una función más conservadora para evitar la presencia de valores asin-
tóticamente nulos21. Esto es mostrado en el gráfico 1 como curva de ajuste exponencial:
Wexp (y) = min {1;exp ( y 2 ) }                                              [44]
Finalmente, se consideró que [43] continuaba permitiendo valores nulos del multiplicador, 
y de los requerimientos de capital asociados, en casos de infinita sobrecolateralizacion. 
Por ello, se decidió establecer un suelo al importe de capital que los conjuntos compen-
sables han de requerir. Finalmente, ello es mostrado en el gráfico 1 en la curva de ajuste 
exponencial con suelo del 5 %:
W SA-CCR (y) = min {1;Floor + (1 – Floor) exp {  2(1 – Floor) }}                   [45]
Las diferencias entre [43], [44] y [45] se pueden observar en el gráfico 1:
20 Para un mayor desarrollo algebraico, consultar Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014).
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En lo referido a los conjuntos de operaciones compensables sin colateralizar, es decir, 
aquellas sin un intercambio de colateral más allá del momento de la firma del contrato, se 
presenta un problema, dado que la fórmula [42] carece de forma cerrada para casos dis-
tintos de V-CE (t) = 0. El SA-CCR adopta un enfoque pragmático en este caso y se limita 
a redefinir la variable y definida en [42]:
y =     
V-CCE (MPR) 
                                                        [46]
El 23 de noviembre de 2016 la Comisión Europea presentó su propuesta de modificación 
del Reglamento 575/2013, de requerimientos prudenciales de las entidades de crédito y 
las empresas de inversión (CRR). Está previsto que esta propuesta se comience a aplicar 
transcurridos dos años desde su publicación en el Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea, 
hecho que no se ha producido todavía. El objetivo declarado de dicha propuesta es adop-
tar los nuevos estándares internacionales de captura de riesgos adoptados por BIS, los 
cuales pretenden resultar más sensibles al riesgo que los previamente existentes, alinean-
do requerimientos de capital con riesgo realmente asumido y logrando un uso más efi-
ciente del capital de las entidades de crédito22. Se espera que esto redunde en una mejo-
ra de la economía de la Unión. Es destacable que esta propuesta de modificación de la 
CRR incorpora, junto a la modificación del tratamiento del riesgo de contraparte, otras 
propuestas de modificación, como la de la ratio de apalancamiento y la Fundamental Re-
view of the Trading Book (FRTB). El impacto a largo plazo estimado por la Comisión de la 
introducción de todo el paquete legislativo propuesto restaría entre un –0,03 % y un 
–0,06 % del PIB, mientras que ello habría contribuido a reducir un 32 % el importe de los 
fondos públicos inyectados en apoyo del sistema bancario en una situación de crisis simi-
lar a la vivida durante los años 2007 y 2008.
La introducción del SA-CCR en la CRR se ha realizado a través de la modificación de los 
artículos 273 a 299 del capítulo 6, título II, de la parte tercera de dicha normativa. Como 
se puede comprobar de inmediato, se trata de una modificación sustantiva de dicho 
bloque. Para ello, resultará necesario adaptar las definiciones utilizadas por la CRR a este 
nuevo marco, la sustitución del CEM y su reemplazo por el nuevo SA-CCR. Del mismo 
modo, se produce la eliminación del SA y se modifica el Método de la Exposición Original 
(OEM)23, 24. Así mismo, se permite la aplicación de un SA-CCR simplificado que resulta 
novedoso y, junto al OEM, es específico de la regulación comunitaria.
La propuesta de modificación comunitaria incorpora la totalidad del marco del Comité ya 
descrito. Adicionalmente, empero, incluye una serie de especificidades que son debidas a 
razones de técnica jurídica y de necesaria adaptación al marco regulatorio comunitario pre-
existente, o bien a razones materiales. Nos centraremos principalmente en estas últimas.
En primer lugar, se permitirá un caso donde la EAD sería nula. Esto solo será posible cuan-
do el conjunto de operaciones compensables incorpore opciones vendidas en exclusiva, 
el valor de mercado del acuerdo de compensación resulte negativo en todo momento, las 
primas asociadas ya hayan sido satisfactoriamente cobradas, y no existan acuerdos de 
22 Véase Explanatory Memorandum, en European Commission (2016).
23  Para una descripción detallada de los distintos modelos de cálculo contemplados en la CRR, consultar Gil y 
Manzano (2013).
24  El Método de la Exposición Original no es contemplado por el Comité como una de las opciones regulatorias 
disponibles. No obstante, está diseñado para ser aplicado por aquellas entidades cuyas exposiciones en deri-
vados y asimilados no sobrepasan un umbral de materialidad.
3  Incorporación al 
ordenamiento jurídico 
de la Unión Europea
Add-on no-marginaggregate
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reposición de márgenes. Esto no estaba incluido en el marco de Basilea (el acuerdo a 
estos efectos), pero este había reconocido dicha opción en una de las Frequently Asked 
Questions25 respondidas al respecto.
En segundo lugar, el acuerdo reconoce la presencia de colateral, tal y como ya se ha 
descrito. La propuesta de modificación de la CRR obliga a que, cuando todas las tran-
sacciones del conjunto compensable estén registradas en la cartera de negociación, se 
cumplan las reglas del artículo 299. Los efectos de este artículo son, esencialmente, 
determinar qué elementos no asimilables al efectivo son admisibles y la remisión al 
artículo 223, «Método amplio de colateral financiero», en lo relativo a su valoración. 
Cuando dentro de uno de estos conjuntos compensables se incorpore alguna opera-
ción no incluida dentro de la cartera de negociación prudencial, la lista de colateral 
admisible será más restringida.
En lo referido al mapeo necesario a las distintas clases de activos, se incorpora una nueva: 
Otros riesgos. Esta constituirá un único HS a los efectos de cálculo de la PFE. Así mismo, 
se establece como regla general que las entidades utilicen sus modelos prudenciales de 
cálculo de requerimientos de riesgo de mercado para determinar cuál es el factor primario 
de riesgo con mayor sensibilidad a estos efectos. En este mismo punto se encarga a la 
Autoridad Bancaria Europea (EBA) que desarrolle con mayor detalle cómo identificar los 
factores de riesgo primarios para entidades que apliquen los métodos de cálculo de re-
querimientos por riesgo de mercado menos sofisticados, así como las reglas aplicables en 
presencia de más de un riesgo material.
En lo referido a la definición de HS a efectos del cálculo de la PFE, ninguna novedad rele-
vante más allá del reconocimiento de que la categoría Otros riesgos formará un HS sepa-
rado y que se permite de manera expresa a las autoridades competentes que soliciten el 
detalle necesario para determinar cómo se están tratando aquellas operaciones donde 
el principal factor de riesgo es la volatilidad o el riesgo de base entre factores.
Se encarga a la EBA, igualmente, que desarrolle la fórmula de cálculo del delta, así 
como la calibración necesaria de la volatilidad de tipos de interés compatible con tipos 
negativos. Igualmente, ha de desarrollar qué otros elementos cualitativos se pueden 
considerar para determinar si la posición es larga o corta en el factor de riesgo primario 
en aquellos casos en los cuales los métodos cuantitativos disponibles no faciliten esa 
discriminación.
Quizá la novedad más relevante es la introducción de un SA-CCR simplificado junto a la 
modificación del Método de la Exposición Original. Ambos métodos resultan ser propios 
del ordenamiento jurídico comunitario y tienen como objetivo poner a disposición de las 
entidades métodos de aplicación más sencillos en los casos de un menor tamaño y com-
plejidad. De esta manera, el SA-CCR simplificado podrá ser aplicado por las entidades 
donde la suma del valor de mercado en valor absoluto de las posiciones en derivados no 
exceda del 10 % del total balance ni de 150 millones de euros. Por su parte, el método 
OEM podrá ser aplicado cuando esa métrica no exceda los umbrales reducidos del 5 % y 
de 20 millones de euros.
En lo referido al SA-CCR simplificado, no permite el reconocimiento de NICA en el cálculo 
del RC, y en los casos en los que existe un acuerdo de intercambio de colateral el RC 
25 http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d333.pdf.
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queda reducido a la simple adición de umbrales de reposición de margen e importe mínimo 
que se ha de transferir. Igualmente, desaparece el multiplicador que recoge el efecto de la 
sobrecolateralización de la PFE. También, con respecto a la PFE, simplifica los términos 
MF i y elimina la presencia de deltas distintas de uno, volatilidades y correlaciones.
Finalmente, en relación con el OEM, este se ha vuelto más sensible al riesgo, pero produ-
cirá presumiblemente mayores requerimientos de capital. A partir de ahora, la exposición 
será calculada como la suma de un coste de reposición, calculado de manera similar a 
como lo es en el SA-CCR simplificado, y de un componente de exposición potencial futura 
simplificado. Se permite también un cierto reconocimiento de los beneficios por colatera-
lización y por acuerdos de compensación contractual. Finalmente, se revisan al alza los 
porcentajes que se han de aplicar sobre los nominales involucrados en el cálculo de la 
exposición potencial futura.
El presente artículo ha descrito tanto las debilidades del marco de captura del riesgo de 
contraparte anterior como el nuevo marco SA-CCR propuesto por BIS y su propuesta 
de adaptación a la regulación prudencial comunitaria. 
La implantación del marco descrito en la regulación prudencial de la Unión Europea será 
realizada a través de la modificación del Reglamento 575/2013. Ahora bien, se atenderán 
las peticiones de aplicación proporcionada recibidas tanto de la industria financiera como 
de la EBA, permitiéndose la aplicación de dos métodos simplificados en un esfuerzo por 
racionalizar la aplicación de la norma. Ello parece una solución razonable, habida cuenta 
de la tipología de entidades que utilizan estos productos en muchos casos.
El impacto global de la introducción de este nuevo marco implicará un incremento de los 
requerimientos de capital, según la EBA26, si bien no será significativo en términos agre-
gados, habida cuenta del escaso peso del riesgo de contrapartida en el conjunto de ries-
gos soportados por las entidades. Según las estimaciones de la EBA, este nuevo marco 
supondrá un incremento medio directo del 40 % en los requerimientos específicos por 
riesgo de contraparte y un impacto aún mayor una vez se considere el impacto subsi-
guiente en las exposiciones con cámaras de contrapartida, riesgo por CVA, ratio de apa-
lancamiento y régimen de grandes exposiciones. Esto, en un entorno de reforzamiento de 
los niveles de solvencia medios, resultará sin duda en un impacto de necesaria conside-
ración por parte del sector27.
A juicio del autor, el marco propuesto mejorará sustancialmente la captura de riesgos 
por parte de la regulación prudencial. Ello redundará, desde un punto de vista macro-
prudencial, en una mayor estabilidad del sistema, al acercar el volumen de requerimien-
tos mínimos de capital globales a los riesgos realmente asumidos. Desde un punto de 
vista microprudencial o de la supervisión de su implantación y funcionamiento, la con-
clusión es francamente positiva en ese mismo sentido. Las entidades habrán de calcular 
26 Para mayor detalle, véase el documento de European Banking Authority (2016).
27  No obstante, es necesario destacar la existencia de estudios teóricos que parecen contradecir este incremen-
to previsto de exposición. Así, Wayne y White (2012), además de realizar un pormenorizado esfuerzo descrip-
tivo de los pasos que se han de seguir en la aplicación práctica de los métodos CEM y SA-CCR, realizan una 
comparación de los resultados obtenidos por ellos a través de múltiples carteras. Los requerimientos parece-
rían similares a nivel de operación individual, pero más reducidos, a favor del SA-CCR, en presencia de grandes 
conjuntos compensables de operaciones. Los autores también concluyen que pueden existir incentivos para 
realizar una gestión activa de los resultados de este método. Como limitación del estudio, los autores señalan 
que las carteras analizadas están mayormente enfocadas en tipos de interés y FX, lo cual podrían introducir un 
sesgo indeterminado, así como ciertas limitaciones en la identificación de la delta aplicable.
4 Conclusiones
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sus requerimientos mínimos de capital con un método no dependiente de modelos in-
ternos más sensible al riesgo, lo cual permitirá alinear estos con las cifras ofrecidas por 
metodologías de cálculo de capital económico más sofisticadas. Si bien dichas cifras no 
coincidirán, es esperable que las diferencias se reduzcan y que se mejore la comparabi-
lidad entre entidades. 
No obstante, según el autor, son varias las cautelas que hay que adoptar. El nuevo marco 
nació con el objetivo de ser sencillo de aplicar, pero en comparación con el modelo de 
referencia anterior, el CEM, resulta mucho más complejo de entender y de aplicar. Adicio-
nalmente, la calibración llevada a cabo por el BIS no resultará ajustada a todas las situa-
ciones. Esto debería resolverse parcialmente en el marco del cálculo del capital económi-
co interno por parte de las entidades, donde las más avanzadas en términos de gestión 
de este riesgo deberían poder ofrecer sus propias calibraciones y estimaciones de reque-
rimientos de capital sobre una base de alta comparabilidad. Igualmente, se echa en falta 
una mayor granularidad en categorías como FX. Una única categoría genérica parece 
pobre e insatisfactoria y conduce a una solución similar a la ofrecida por el marco anterior. 
Por otro lado, las entidades, en su interacción con el Comité, mostraron cierta inquietud 
por la arbitrariedad en la definición de los distintos suelos empleados. Finalmente, desde 
un punto de vista más general, el desarrollo de alternativas no basadas en modelos inter-
nos cuantitativamente sofisticados mejora la comparabilidad y la sensibilidad al riesgo, 
pero a costa de reducir potencialmente los incentivos para adoptar los enfoques más 
avanzados de cálculo de capital interno y de gestión. 
Para acabar, y desde un punto de vista más general, recientemente la literatura académica28 
se ha venido mostrando preocupada por la falta de incentivos que las contrapartes pudie-
ran tener en gestionar con eficacia el riesgo de contrapartida surgido en sus posiciones de 
derivados. Más en concreto, se apunta la posibilidad de que las contrapartes con grandes 
exposiciones en derivados son aquellas con los sistemas de gestión de riesgos más efi-
cientes o bien aquellas con perfiles de riesgo más opacos y complejos y sistemas de 
riesgos más inadecuados para esta complejidad. Siguiendo este razonamiento, para 
conseguir alinear de un modo más eficaz los intereses de aquel que tiene la exposición 
crediticia en derivados con los de aquel encargado de gestionar el riesgo subyacente final, 
las políticas de reposición de márgenes29 parecen ser una herramienta al menos tan eficaz 
como los requerimientos de capital. Por ello, en opinión del autor, y como reflexión final, 
no siempre importa cuán sofisticado y sensible sea el marco de cálculo de requerimien-
tos de capital por riesgo de contraparte. Una contraparte puede haber modelizado de 
una manera adecuada los comportamientos previstos del valor del subyacente del con-
trato, pero la presencia de riesgo moral en la contraparte puede acabar por arruinar ese 
esfuerzo. Así, las entidades, los reguladores y los supervisores deben considerar, junto a 
la cuantificación del riesgo asumido en los términos ya descritos en el presente artículo, 
el impacto de las políticas de reposición de márgenes que pudieran existir, o la ausencia 
de ellas y el posible riesgo moral asociado. Con ello, se conseguiría mejorar, sin duda, un 
riesgo ciertamente difícil de gestionar por parte de las entidades. 
28 Véase, por ejemplo, Biais y Heider (2016).
29 A este respecto, véase también Leif Andersen (2017).
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Ignacio Garrido Sánchez
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Reflexiones finales sobre el Banco de España y el FSAP
José Viñals
Número 1 – septiembre 2001
Número 2 – noviembre 2002
Número 3 – julio 2003
Número 4 – mayo 2006
Número 5 – diciembre 2006
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 105 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 32
PUBLICACIONES DEL BANCO DE ESPAÑA
El Banco de España publica distintos tipos de documentos que proporcionan información 
sobre su actividad (informes económicos, información estadística, trabajos de investiga-
ción, etc.). La lista completa de las publicaciones del Banco de España se encuentra en 
su sitio web, en http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/Relacionados/Fic/
Catalogopublicaciones.pdf.
La mayor parte de estos documentos está disponible en formato pdf y se puede descargar 
gratuitamente en el sitio web del Banco de España, http://www.bde.es/bde/es/secciones/
informes/. El resto puede solicitarse a publicaciones@bde.es.
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SIGLAS, ABREVIATURAS Y SIGNOS UTILIZADOS
SIGLAS DE PAÍSES Y MONEDAS
De acuerdo con la práctica de la UE, los países están ordenados según
el orden alfabético de los idiomas nacionales.
BE Bélgica EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (lev búlgaro)
CZ República Checa CZK (corona checa)
DK Dinamarca DKK (corona danesa)
DE Alemania EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Irlanda EUR (euro)
GR Grecia EUR (euro)
ES España EUR (euro)
FR Francia EUR (euro)
HR Croacia HRK (kuna)
IT Italia EUR (euro)
CY Chipre EUR (euro)
LV Letonia EUR (euro)
LT Lituania EUR (euro)
LU Luxemburgo EUR (euro)
HU Hungría HUF (forint húngaro)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Países Bajos EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Polonia PLN (zloty polaco)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Rumanía RON (nuevo leu rumano)
SI Eslovenia EUR (euro)
SK Eslovaquia EUR (euro)
FI Finlandia EUR (euro)
SE Suecia SEK (corona sueca)
UK Reino Unido GBP (libra esterlina)
JP Japón JPY (yen japonés)
US Estados Unidos USD (dólar estadounidense)
ABREVIATURAS Y SIGNOS
M1 Efectivo en manos del público + Depósitos a la vista.
M2 M1 + Depósitos disponibles con preaviso hasta tres meses + 
Depósitos a pla zo hasta dos años.
M3 M2 + Cesiones temporales + Participaciones en fondos del 
mercado mo ne ta rio e instrumentos del mer ca do monetario + 
Valores distintos de acciones emitidos hasta dos años.
m€/me Millones de euros.
mm Miles de millones.
A Avance.
P Puesta detrás de una fecha [ene (P)], indica que todas las cifras 
co rres pon dien tes son provisionales. Puesta detrás de una cifra, 








Tasa de la media móvil de i términos, con j de desfase, 
convertida a tasa anual.
mj Tasa de crecimiento básico de período j.
M Referido a datos anuales (1970 M) o trimestrales, indica que 
estos son me dias de los datos mensuales del año o trimestre, y 
referido a series de datos mensuales, decenales o semanales, 
que estos son  medias de los datos dia rios de dichos pe ríodos.
R Referido a un año o mes (99 R), indica que existe una 
discontinuidad entre los datos de ese período y el siguiente.
... Dato no disponible.
— Cantidad igual a cero, inexistencia del fenómeno considerado
o carencia de signifi cado de una variación al expresarla en tasas
de crecimiento.
0,0 Cantidad inferior a la mitad del último dígito indicado en la serie.
AAPP Administraciones Públicas
AIAF Asociación de Intermediarios de Activos Financieros
ANFAC Asociación Nacional de Fabricantes de Automóviles y 
Camiones
BCE Banco Central Europeo
BCN Bancos Centrales Nacionales
BE Banco de España
BOE Boletín Ofi cial del Estado
BPI Banco de Pagos Internacionales




CECA Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros
CEM Confederación Española de Mutualidades
CFEE Cuentas Financieras de la Economía Española
CNAE Clasifi cación Nacional de Actividades Económicas
CNE Contabilidad Nacional de España
CNMV Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores
DEG Derechos Especiales de Giro
DGSFP Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones
DGT Dirección General de Tráfi co
DGTPF Dirección General del Tesoro y Política Financiera
EC Entidades de crédito
EFC Establecimientos fi nancieros de crédito
Eonia Índice medio del tipo de interés del euro a un día
(Euro Overnight Index Average)
Euríbor Tipo de interés de oferta de los depósitos interbancarios
en euros (Euro Interbank Offered Rate)
Eurostat Ofi cina de Estadística de las Comunidades Europeas
EPA Encuesta de población activa
FAAF Fondo para la Adquisición de Activos Financieros
FEADER Fondo Europeo Agrícola de Desarrollo Rural
FEAGA Fondo Europeo Agrícola de Garantía
FEDER Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional
FEOGA Fondo Europeo de Orientación y Garantía Agrícola
FEP Fondo Europeo de Pesca
FFPP Fondos de Pensiones
FGD Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos de Entidades de Crédito
FIAMM Fondos de Inversión en Activos del Mercado Monetario
FIM Fondos de Inversión Mobiliaria
FMI Fondo Monetario Internacional
FMM Fondos del Mercado Monetario
FSE Fondo Social Europeo
IAPC Índice Armonizado de Precios de Consumo
ICO Instituto de Crédito Ofi cial
IFM Instituciones Financieras Monetarias
IGAE Intervención General de la Administración del Estado
IIC Instituciones de Inversión Colectiva
INE Instituto Nacional de Estadística
INVERCO Asociación de Instituciones de Inversión Colectiva
y Fondos de Pensiones
IPC Índice de Precios de Consumo
IPI Índice de Producción Industrial
IPRI Índice de Precios Industriales
IPSEBENE Índice de Precios de Servicios y de Bienes Elaborados
No Energéticos
ISFLSH Instituciones Sin Fines de Lucro al Servicio de los Hogares
IVA Impuesto sobre el Valor Añadido
NEDD Normas Especiales de Distribución de Datos del FMI
OBS Obra Benéfi co-Social
OCDE Organización de Cooperación y Desarrollo Económicos
OIFM Otras Instituciones Financieras Monetarias
OM Orden Ministerial
OOAA Organismos Autónomos
OOAAPP Otras Administraciones Públicas
OPEP Organización de Países Exportadores de Petróleo
OSR Otros Sectores Residentes
PDE Protocolo de Défi cit Excesivo
PEC Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento
PIB Producto Interior Bruto
PIBpm Producto Interior Bruto a precios de mercado
PNB Producto Nacional Bruto
RD Real Decreto
RM Resto del Mundo
Sareb Sociedad de Gestión de Activos Procedentes de la 
Reestructuración Bancaria
SCLV Sistema de Compensación y Liquidación de Valores
SEC Sistema Europeo de Cuentas 
SEPE Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal
SME Sistema Monetario Europeo
TAE Tasa Anual Equivalente
TEDR Tipo Efectivo Defi nición Restringida
UE Unión Europea
UEM Unión Económica y Monetaria
UE-15 Países componentes de la Unión Europea a 30.4.2004
UE-25 Países componentes de la Unión Europea desde 1.5.2004
UE-27 Países componentes de la Unión Europea desde 1.1.2007
UE-28 Países componentes de la Unión Europea desde 1.7.2013
VNA Variación Neta de Activos
VNP Variación Neta de Pasivos
